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City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: How Supreme Court
Jurisprudence of the Past Puts a Chokehold on
Constitutional Rights in the Present
Peter C. Douglas*
ABSTRACT
The United States today has refocused its attention on its continuing struggles with
civil rights and police violence—struggles that have always been present but which come
to the forefront of the collective consciousness at inflection points like the current one.
George Floyd—and uncounted others—die at the hands of the police, and there is,
justifiably, outrage and a search for answers. Although the reasons why Black and Brown
people are disproportionally subject to unconstitutional police violence are manifold, one
reason lies in the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. While
many scholars have criticized the Burger Court’s Lyons decision from a variety of valuable
vantage points, this Note takes a different approach, considering the extent to which Lyons
was the product not of a single Court, but of generations of jurists. Through an extensive
historical case study, this Note hopes to provide a new perspective on why the Lyons
decision was wrong and why the majority opinion failed to support its holding. With the
Lyons ancestry laid bare, this Note then uses that historical understanding to advocate for
greater transparency in federal jurisprudence. Specifically, this Note argues that decisions
like Lyons are, in part, made possible by obfuscatory jurisprudential approaches to
“saying what the law is.” Regardless of the precise nature of the federal judiciary’s
systemic problems, certain jurisprudential methodologies tend to reinforce and preserve
those problems. To begin addressing systemic issues in the federal judiciary, we must
embrace some modest, but powerful, adjustments to how jurists “say what the law is.”
Keywords: jurisprudence, police violence, civil rights, race, legal history, Lyons,
constitutional rights, Supreme Court, federal judiciary
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INTRODUCTION
George Floyd was murdered.1 The Minneapolis Police choked him to death.2 And
his grave is not a lonely one.3 Alongside Floyd lie many others who were wrongfully
choked to death by the police.4 Many have died from chokeholds, but there are many more
who—like Floyd—were strangled beneath an officer’s knee. And while myriad factors
surely contributed to their deaths,5 they might all still be alive if the Supreme Court had
not rejected the attempt of one man—Adolph Lyons—to stop the use of police chokeholds
in non-life-threatening situations.6
The Court’s 1983 decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons now stands in the way of
those who seek to enjoin not only chokeholds, but any practice employed by local law
enforcement.7 Lyons has all but closed the courthouse doors to those who would challenge
1

Verdict, Count II, State of Minnesota v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646, 2021 WL 1559174 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 20, 2021).
2
For nine minutes and twenty-nine seconds, a Minneapolis Police officer held the handcuffed Floyd face
down on the pavement by pressing his knee between Floyd’s head and neck. George Floyd: What
Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC NEWS (Jul. 16, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-52861726; Eric Levenson, Former Officer Knelt on George Floyd for 9 Minutes and 29 Seconds
– Not the Infamous 8:46, CNN (Mar. 30, 2021, 6:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/29/us/georgefloyd-timing-929-846/index.html. Bodycam footage showed that Floyd told the officers “more than 20
times [that] he could not breathe . . . .” BBC NEWS, supra. After about six minutes, Floyd “fell silent[.]” Id.
3
Monika Evstatieva & Tim Mak, How Decades of Bans on Police Chokeholds Have Fallen Short, NPR
(June 16, 2020, 5:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/16/877527974/how-decades-of-bans-on-policechokeholds-have-fallen-short.
4
See infra note 46, and accompanying text. As Paul Butler argues, “the Court has created the legal platform
for black lives not to matter to police.” PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 56 (The New
Press ed. 2018). It has “given the police unprecedented power, with everybody understanding that these
powers will mainly be used against African Americans and Latinos.” Id. at 57.
5
When I write “myriad factors,” I do not mean to give credence to any argument that Floyd died as a result
of anything other than unconstitutional and racist police violence as a direct and proximate cause. Rather, I
mean to acknowledge that, while there are many societal factors that converge to explain unconstitutional
police violence directed at Black and Brown individuals and communities, the Supreme Court’s role should
not be forgotten. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, PRESUMED GUILTY, xi–xiii (2021) (noting that, while “much
attention is focused on the enormous problems of police violence and racism in law enforcement, . . . too
often that attention fails to place the blame where much of it belongs: on the Supreme Court”). For
discussions of such factors, ranging from social and cultural racism and gender violence to property
discrimination and the carceral industrial complex, see, e.g., Jonathan Andrew Perez, Rioting by a Different
Name: The Voice of the Unheard in the Age of George Floyd, and the History of the Laws, Policies, and
Legislation of Systemic Racism, 24 J. GENDER RACE & JUST., 87, 88–89, 92 (2021); Justice in America
Episode 20: Mariame Kaba and Prison Abolition, THE APPEAL (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/justice-in-america-episode-20-mariame-kaba-and-prison-abolition/; Ruth Wilson
Gilmore Makes the Case for Abolition, THE INTERCEPT (Jun. 10, 2020, 5:02 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/06/10/ruth-wilson-gilmore-makes-the-case-for-abolition/.
6
See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, How the Supreme Court Helped Make it Possible for Police to Kill by Chokehold,
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 4, 2014, 7:09 PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/how-the-supreme-courthelped-make-it-possible-for-police-to-kill-by-chokehold-d9f17a773190/.
7
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that “the kind of chokehold that killed George Floyd
remains in use in most of the United States because of the Supreme Court’s ruling” in Lyons, which
“dramatically constrains the ability of the federal judiciary to stop police from using unconstitutional and
racist practices like the chokehold”). See generally Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue the Police, 104
MINN. L. REV. 2257 (2020); Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s
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systemic police violence in their communities.8 And the ramifications of the Lyons decision
are not limited to the direct effects of unbridled police violence; indirectly, the decision
may have contributed to the (justifiable) violence that erupts as a reaction to
unconstitutional and racist police violence.9
Over the past four decades, legal scholars have widely criticized the Lyons decision.10
Broadly speaking, what is unsettling about Lyons is that it “remove[d] an entire class of
constitutional violations from the equitable powers of a federal court.”11 And, indeed, as
Misuse of Lyons’s Realistic Threat of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837 (2010); Brandon Garrett,
Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815 (2000);
Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933
(1993); Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1085 (1987).
8
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR 98 (2017).
9
As Vicki Jackson has suggested in the context of the Rodney King incident, the subsequent rioting might
have been avoided had Lyons not precluded “earlier injunctive relief and related judicial monitoring.” Vicki
C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 134 (2014). “Of
course, whether or not allowing standing [in Lyons] would have led to further relief against the LAPD, and
if so, whether it would have been effective in disrupting the culture of racism and violence [in the LAPD],
are uncertain; but the failure to allow the possibility of such relief raises haunting questions of what might
have been.” Id.; See also Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 206–07 (1952) (“[T]he defense of civil rights by the courts is a force not only for democratic
values but for social order. If repressed by those who control the local police, the social and political
aspirations of the people would often spill over into rioting . . . . Nothing has destroyed the essential
solidarity of a people more effectively than policies of repression imposed by the strong on the weak.”).
10
See infra notes 11, 14–23, and accompanying text.
11
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 137 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 8, at 95 (arguing that the most important reason the Lyons “decision is wrong” is that now “no
one could sue the LAPD and the City of Los Angeles to stop this practice”); Jackson, supra note 9, at 136
(arguing that Lyons suffered from “triple error” in that first, “members of political or racial minorities[]
were remitted to the very majoritarian processes of whose results they complained[,]” second, “the
predictable failures of the political processes to remedy the complained-of conduct . . . may have
contributed to very adverse developments for bona fide social interests in peace, order, and security[,]” and
third, “continuing to close the doors to litigants pressing the kinds of constitutional claims on which the
courts have a particularly significant role to play in a democratic constitutional society is inconsistent with
the long term institutional interests of the judiciary in being seen as a forum for protecting the rights of all
of the people”); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 808–09 (2016) (In Lyons, “the
Supreme Court strongly curtailed the ability of private litigants to challenge police brutality and abuse at a
structural level.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens
in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1398–99 (2000) (“The [Lyons] Court’s
application of this ‘equitable standing’ bar has ensured that victims of police brutality will rarely, if ever, be
allowed to enjoin injurious police practices.”); Little, supra note 7, at 936 (“The rule of Lyons . . . is
particularly treacherous. It is not only a seemingly neutral procedural instrument for crafting a desired
substantive outcome, but it also terminates litigation before the true nature of the dispute has come to full
view.”); Michael J. Schmidtberger, No Holds Barred in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons: Standing to Seek
Injunctions in Federal Court against Municipalities, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 183, 196 (1984) (Lyons
“constructs a scenario in which arbitrary unconstitutional behavior becomes self-immunizing.”). See also
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371,
1381 (1988). In similar tenor, critics have likewise assaulted standing doctrine more generally. See Gene R.
Nichol, Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 322 (2002) (“The
standing doctrine has already rendered the Accounts Clause, the Incompatibility Clause, the Emoluments
Clause, and part of the Establishment Clause unenforceable. It is difficult to understand, though, why the
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this Note will discuss, one of the problems with the majority opinion in Lyons is that it
sweeps too broadly, all but precluding even narrowly tailored federal remedial action. Such
a sweeping holding was neither necessary under the facts nor supported by the opinion. To
everyone today who feels “wrath and outrage”12 over each new incident of unconstitutional
police violence, the decision’s substantive effect speaks for itself. But as a matter of law,
the majority opinion demands further explication. By creating a form of remedial
standing13—whereby standing must be found for each form of requested relief—the Lyons
holding forecloses, even at the pleading stage, a federal court’s power to enjoin recurring
unconstitutional police violence. And for many, it is not just Lyons’s holding that is
disturbing; the majority’s rationale is also unsettling.14 The several failures of that rationale
small, confused tail of the standing doctrine wags such a large, important pack of dogs.”); Donald L.
Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge
Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 57, 76 (1985) (arguing that “the current standing model creates a
class of cases where government may, with impunity, violate the Constitution”). See also Suzanna Sherry,
Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 624 (1986); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in
the Supreme Court – A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 684 (1973).
12
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 137 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the
Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
14
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that, “[s]ince no one can show that he will be choked in the future, no
one—not even a person who, like Lyons, has almost been choked to death—has standing to challenge the
continuation of the policy.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113. “Under the view expressed by the majority today,”
Marshall continued, “if the police adopt a policy of ‘shoot to kill,’ or a policy of shooting one out of ten
suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to enjoin its continuation.” Id. at 137. To Marshall, as to
others, the majority’s fragmentation of the standing inquiry on the basis of the relief sought was
unequivocally contrary to Supreme Court precedent: “Standing has always depended on whether the
plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy . . . not on the precise nature of the relief
sought.” Id. at 114. Precedent only required “an allegation of ‘threatened or actual injury.” Id. at 124
(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974)) (emphasis in original). See also Gene R. Nichol,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 329 (2002) (questioning the
majority’s assumption that illegal individual conduct was necessary to trigger the challenged official
conduct); Winter, supra note 11, at 1374–75, 1489, 1510–11 (noting that Lyons “disaggregated individuals
who shared an important, life-or-death interest”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR
95 (2017) (arguing that Lyons represents “a substantial departure from prior practice[]” because the
Supreme Court had “[n]ever before . . . determined standing on the basis of the remedy sought”); Jackson,
supra note 9, at 165 (“In bifurcating the injury from the remedy as the Court did, it acted in an
unprecedented manner, going beyond the holdings of the principal cases on which it relied.”); Susan
Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1339–40 (1999)
(discussing how the Lyons Court’s “retreat to mechanistic formalism and . . . ascription of responsibility
elsewhere” allowed the Court “both to disaggregate systemic conduct and to avoid dealing with its ugly
consequences[,]” which took the form of both fragmenting the standing inquiry and “fragmenting Lyons’
own interests into individualized rather than communitarian concerns”); Laura E. Little, It’s About Time:
Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 933, 936 (1993) (arguing that the Court’s
collapsing of the jurisdictional analysis and “remedial concerns into a single threshold enterprise . . . . [is]
unnecessarily severe . . . [and] unwisely obscures the concerns at the heart of the decision whether to issue
an injunction”); Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive Relief in Section 1983
Actions, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, 1100 (1987) (arguing that Lyons’s standing determination was “not
warranted by the purpose underlying the standing doctrine . . . . [nor] by the purpose underlying Section
1983”); Sherry, supra note 11, at 628 (noting that the majority’s rationale was “peculiar” because, “[b]y
fragmenting the general standing inquiry into separate inquiries for each of the plaintiff’s claims, the Court
created for itself a before-the-fact ‘line item veto’ power that may undercut the utility of the broad
discretion courts have to fashion appropriate equitable relief[,]” and because “for the purpose of
determining Lyons’s standing, the Court separated the damage claim from the injunctive claim, but for the
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and the inadequacies of the majority opinion form much of this Note’s substance. And the
necessity of jurists providing transparent, thorough opinions to support their holdings
forms much of this Note’s recommendations.
Many scholars have focused their critiques of Lyons on the 1983 Court that rendered
the decision.15 Critics have charged the Burger Court with engaging in a “project”—
epitomized by decisions like Lyons—“to expand the power of the police against people of
color.”16 They have charged the Court with “willful color-blindness”;17 with engaging in a
“supermajoritarian” paternalism to “save the majority from its own excesses”;18 with
protecting the interests of the powerful, the White, and the privileged at the expense of the
vulnerable—those who are members of political and racial minorities;19 with lacking
purpose of determining mootness, the Court considered the two claims together”); Fallon, supra note 13, at
51–52 (arguing that it is dangerous to apply mootness concerns in the standing inquiry because standing is
a threshold matter while mootness is generally addressed after greater factual development);
Schmidtberger, supra note 11, at 194 (“Lyons neglects the distinction between an unharmed plaintiff who
seeks only equitable relief and a harmed plaintiff who seeks damages and injunctive relief in a fragmented
suit.”); Harvard Law Review Association, Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, 97 HARV. L. REV. 215, 219–
24 (1983) (“The Court’s fragmented approach to standing in Lyons departs from the Court’s previous
practice of focusing the standing inquiry on the individual litigant’s right to invoke the jurisdiction of the
court.”). But see Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1218–19 (2014) (arguing that the
majority “was right to insist on testing . . . [Lyons’] standing as to each form of relief”).
15
See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 11; Schmidtberger, supra note 11.
16
Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 246 (2010). To Butler, this
project, which extends through the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, includes cases like Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), where “police got the power to stop and frisk . . . . [which is] the most visceral manifestation
of the state in” the lives of African American men, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), where the police
were granted the super power to kill to enforce a traffic infraction, Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001), where the police were given the super power to arrest “for any crime—no matter how minor and
even if punishment for being found guilty of the crime does not include prison time,” and Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), where the use of racial profiling in pretextual traffic stops was “blessed” by
the Supreme Court. PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 57–59, 82–83 (The New Press ed.
2018). Butler argues that the Lyons decision epitomizes how the Court empowers police to preserve the
racial order: “The United States Supreme Court decided a case about chokeholds that tells you everything
you need to know about how criminal ‘justice’ works for African American men.” Id. at 56.
17
In cases like Lyons, the Court rarely mentions race. Butler, supra note 16 at 247. See also Harvard Law
Review Association, supra note 14, at 223 (“The Lyons Court belittled—by ignoring—the seriousness of
the police brutality faced by blacks in this country.”).
18
In cases like Lyons, “the Court’s concern with community interests is even greater than that objectively
evinced by the community itself. When the Court takes a narrow reading of statutes enacted for the benefit
of the politically disadvantaged, it engages in a sort of ‘supermajoritarianism’ that goes beyond the
expressed community interest in order to save the majority from its own excesses.” Suzanna Sherry, Issue
Manipulation by the Burger Court, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 660, 663, n.101 (1986). See also Girardeau A.
Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1425, 1476 (1995) (noting that the “Court has
even invalidated majoritarian efforts to protect minority rights when those efforts have failed to comport
with the Court’s conception of majority self-interest” and that the Court’s own vision of its “job is to
prevent the tyranny of the minority and to ensure that the majority is not disadvantaged by its own
shortsightedness”).
19
Footnote Four in United States v. Carolene Products Co. states that “Prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The themes at play in
Footnote 4 “ask us to focus . . . on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes
have reached, has been unduly constricted.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 77 (Harvard
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empathy for those who run in sharply different socioeconomic circles than do the Justices;20
with hyper-valuing monetary relief and assuming that Lyons sued only out of self-interest,

University Press 1980). Gene Nichol argues that the Court’s injury analysis “systematically favors the
powerful over the powerless” and in so doing “turns the theory of Carolene Products’ famed footnote
neatly on its head.” Gene R. Nichol, Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U.L.
REV. 301, 322 (2002) “[T]he power to trigger judicial review is afforded most readily to those who have
traditionally enjoyed the greatest access to the processes of democratic government” while “historically
victimized groups . . . . must prove greater consequential harms, must show closer causation links, and must
surmount greater redressability hurdles.” Id. at 333. Specifically writing of Lyons, Nichol argues that,
“[w]hen litigants complain of run-ins with the Los Angeles police department,” the Supreme Court’s
“predictable tendency lodges standing law squarely on the side of privilege.” Id. at 327. Nichol captures
this favoritism most succinctly when he notes that the federalism concerns that counseled restraint in Lyons
“melted away” in Bush v. Gore because “George W. Bush is not Adolph Lyons.” Id. at 328. This penchant
is not surprising since the Court “has revealed itself over the last 220 years to be an institution that favors
the rule of social elites[,]” from “Federalist elite[s]” and “slave-holding elite[s]” to “business elites” and
“cultural elites.” Steven G. Calabresi, Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the
Separation of Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 544 (2012). See also Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the
Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 174 (2014) (questioning whether the Court has lived
up to the duty ascribed to it by Judge Antonin Scalia, who argued that standing doctrine “roughly restricts
courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions by
the majority”) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983)); Spann, supra note 18, at 1423–24 (arguing that “the
institutional function of the Supreme Court in American culture has consistently been to facilitate the
subordination of racial minority interests to white majority interests”).
20
Gene R. Nichol, Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U.L. REV. 301, 328 (2002).
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rather than out of altruism;21 with judicial activism masquerading as judicial restraint;22
and with abdicating the Court’s constitutional duty.23 All of these critiques may possess
As Steven Winter argues, standing doctrine “allows only the possibility that we act out of self-interest; it
ignores the fact that we often act out of concern for others” and thus “devalues the social importance of
altruism.” Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1371, 1503, 1511 (1988). To some, this denial of the individual as defender of the public flies in the
face of our constitutional trust, for, if the Constitution is viewed as a trust through which the public
collective, acting as settlor, empowers the government to act as trustee, then the beneficiaries of that trust
share a “clear collective societal interest in having the government behave in strict accord with the
Constitution.” Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 96 (1985). See also Susan Bandes,
Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1338 (1999) (discussing
anecdotalism in the police brutality cases and arguing that the “common law paradigm” at work in cases
like Lyons “is based on the notion of each litigant as an autonomous actor, impelled by rugged, even
heartless, individualism[]” and that this “paradigm dictates that a plaintiff charging police brutality will be
seen as motivated solely by greed or fear for his own well-being, that he can easily be bought off with
money, that he has no long term concerns for good government or community, and that his adversary is an
individual like him, of equal power and similar motivations”); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 227, 229 (1990) (arguing that the Court acts “on the unarticulated, reflexive assumption that a case
is an even contest between private individuals for material stakes . . . . [and this] unstated acceptance of the
private rights model leads to a refusal to recognize the cognizability of collective rights and collective
harms”). For discussions of how the particularization requirement of standing is of relatively recent
vintage, see generally James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-orControversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170 (2018); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History
Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1432 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961).
22
Suzanna Sherry argues that the Lyons Court “combined notions of restraint with procedural activism to
restrict the scope of a statutory right.” Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 611, 649 n.166 (1986). Sherry more broadly contends that the Burger Court “maintained its posture
of judicial restraint when doing so denie[d] protection to individual rights, while simultaneously expanding
its jurisdiction in order to decrease the protection afforded individual rights by Congress and the states.” Id.
at 619 n.19. “Although putatively espousing a theory of judicial restraint premised on constitutional
arguments, the Court is engaging in an activism that effectively restricts individual and minority rights.” Id.
at 615. Lyons “exemplifies . . . the [Court’s] hostility to the phenomena of public law litigation, and the
unrestrained reworking of doctrine to obtain a ‘restrained’ result.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability,
Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34
(1984). See also Paul Butler, “A Long Step Down the Totalitarian Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent
in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9, 32 (2009).
23
Lyons “itself shows that it is possible to abdicate essential judicial obligation . . . .” Gene R. Nichol,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 338 (2002). See generally
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 111 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]here wrongs to individuals are done
by violation of specific guarantees, it is abdication for courts to close their doors.”). Two years after Flast,
Justice Brennan penned a concurrence in Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp—in which
Justice White joined—in which he argued against a standing inquiry that “involve[s] a determination on the
merits.” 397 U.S. 159, 177 (1970). Brennan concluded by quoting Justice Douglas on the abdication of the
courts. Id. at 178. Interestingly, as Kenneth E. Scott has noted, Brennan trimmed the quote a bit, writing
21
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some explanatory power over why the Burger Court chose to silence, rather than listen to,
Adolph Lyons.24 Certainly the five Justices who formed the majority bear some direct
responsibility, for rejecting Lyons’s claim for injunctive relief required an unprecedented
fragmentation of the standing inquiry.25 The Burger Court did, indeed, break new ground—
even in its equitable-restraint and federalism dicta26—so the Lyons decision did not
ineluctably flow from precedent. And, if parts of the majority decision could be supported,
the Court failed to do so. But the Burger Court cannot, alone, bear the weight of the Lyons
decision. For Lyons—like all Supreme Court decisions—was the product of generations of
Supreme Courts. And, in this sense, our modern focus on the political leanings and
normative biases of sitting Justices fails to account fully for the multi-generational
character of the Court.
It is the nature of our jurisprudence that jurists (at least theoretically) largely
rationalize their judicial opinions via existing caselaw.27 Supreme Court jurisprudence is
cumulative, with each Court approaching the cases of the present with the tools of the past.
When the Court sits down “to say what the law is[,]”28 the Justices begin with what the law
has been. While the political branches often pass legislation or take executive action for
which there is no historical predicate, the judiciary does not act so unencumbered by
history. Supreme Court decisions are not merely the work of those Justices currently sitting
on the bench; rather, they are the products of generations of jurists. Holding a particular
Justice or Court singularly responsible for rendering a particular (and possibly wrong)
decision is akin to blaming the tip of the iceberg for the sinking of the Titanic. To
understand why the Titanic foundered, we must look beneath the surface. And to
understand why Lyons came out the way it did, we must dig into its ancestry.
This Note argues, first, that the Lyons decision is emblematic of this larger
jurisprudential truth. Lyons was not the work of the Burger Court alone. And focusing too
narrowly on that Court’s contributions to the Lyons rationale obscures the extent to which
the majority opinion is the work of Justices who had passed long before Justice White

only that “where wrongs to individuals are done . . . it is abdication for courts to close their doors.”
Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court – A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 689
(1973). Brennan “found the restriction [by violation of specific guarantees] altogether unnecessary.” Id. See
also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) (“With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a
case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution.”). See also Bandes, supra note 21, at 285 (“By keying cognizable injury to the
number of people who share it, the Court increasingly abdicates its role as the power of the political
branches grows.”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question”, 79 NW. U. L. REV.
1031, 1059–60 (1985).
24
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1460 (1988)
25
See, e.g., Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 14, at 219–24; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 114 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
26
See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 134, 135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27
This is not to suggest that individual opinions are always supported by precedent or that individual jurists
are not subject to their own biases when deciding cases or exercising their jurisprudential discretion.
However, for the purposes of this Note, the focus is on how jurists rationalize their opinions rather than on
what motivates them.
28
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
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constructed “his” opinion.29 If we want to understand why the Court refused to listen to
Adolph Lyons—if we want to understand the Court’s role in the deaths of those like George
Floyd—then we must read the case’s history, the myriad lines of cases—the lineages—that
came together and manifested in the Burger Court’s majority opinion. Studying those
lineages reveals that Adolph Lyons was denied standing not only because of the normative
biases30 and judicial activism31 of the Burger Court, but also because of the normative
biases and judicial activism of past Courts. Studying the Lyons lineages exposes a longstanding, multi-generational bias in our jurisprudence. It shows how the very nature of
Supreme Court jurisprudence allows the (arguably unprincipled) principles of our
ancestors to determine our fate today. And it helps to demonstrate how (unintentional or
intentional) obfuscation in jurisprudence sets the table for bad opinions and worse
decisions. Justice Robert Jackson, dissenting from the Court’s ignominious decision in
Korematsu v. United States, wrote that “once a judicial opinion rationalizes [a racially
discriminatory] order to show that it conforms to the Constitution . . . . [t]he principle then
lies about like a loaded weapon . . . . Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in
our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.”32 This Note explores what “loaded
weapons” earlier Courts left lying about for the Burger Court to “expand . . . to new
purposes” in Lyons.
Second, this Note argues for greater transparency in jurisprudence. Over time,
jurisprudence reduces the factual and political contexts of cases and controversies to
seemingly neutral principles. When jurists state a principle without identifying its factual
origins, they obscure the law. And with each generation repeating the principle—and
sometimes further obscuring both its meaning and import—“the original understanding is
increasingly distorted[,]” just as in a game of telephone.33 For the law is not doctrine
derived from cases and controversies; the law is cases and controversies. Over generations
of Courts, the cumulative effect of such a reductionist approach to “say[ing] what the law
is” cloaks modern decisions in the illusion of historical legitimacy. It is far easier to write
opinions like that of the majority in Lyons when jurists do not feel the need to acknowledge
the factual origins or jurisprudential development of the principles on which they rely. The
factual context from which the original principle sprouted must be incorporated into later
29

See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, How the Supreme Court Helped Make it Possible for Police to Kill by Chokehold,
THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 4, 2014, 7:09 PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/how-the-supreme-courthelped-make-it-possible-for-police-to-kill-by-chokehold-d9f17a773190/ (arguing that Lyons’s story is “the
story of how arcane legal doctrines can reshape decades of police practices”).
30
For thorough discussions of how normative biases play out in Supreme Court jurisprudence, see Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1068–70 (2015) (discussing how
standing doctrine has fragmented along normative lines); Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106
NW. L. REV. 55, 58 (2012) (discussing how all of standing’s elements that involve probability are prey to
the biases of the jurist); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1155 (1993) (discussing how normative biases infect determinations of injury cognizability);
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 231–32 (1988) (arguing that the injuryin-fact requirement cannot be applied neutrally).
31
See Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 649 n.166 (1986).
32
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 264–65 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing
how the Court’s result in that case was “the product of an exercise akin to the child’s game of ‘telephone,’
in which a message is repeated from one person to another and then another [, and] after some time, the
message bears little resemblance to what was originally spoken”).
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reliance on the principle, and every change in the principle must, likewise, be
acknowledged. With this in mind, that the majority opinion in Lyons fails to adequately
contextualize and justify its holding is one of this Note’s primary critiques.
While transparency will not, alone, undo bad decisions or cure systemic problems, it
should enhance the federal judiciary’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public and shift the
conversation away from the political leanings of the current judges and Justices and toward
the historical leanings of the judiciary as a whole. Only by investing in transparency can
we begin to understand how the biases of our ancestors influence the opinions of the current
Court. Only through a historical understanding of systemic issues can we hope to reform
the third branch.34 We must confront and interrogate our principles, not stripped of their
facts, but fully clothed in them. Then, and only then, can we make informed decisions about
whether to keep or discard those principles. Only then can we begin to reconcile the
disconnect between what our law is and what we want it to be, regardless of political
ideology. While such factual origins may be readily apparent to legal scholars and jurists,
they are not so clear to the people who are practically affected by judicial decisions. Some
jurists already put forth the (sometimes marginal and sometimes substantial) effort to
transparently contextualize the principles on which they rely for the benefit of the parties
involved,35 but it is a project in which all must engage for it to have meaningful effects.
And it is essential that jurists make this effort, for the legitimacy of a branch that has
“neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment[,]” depends upon the nature and strength
of its opinions.36 Regardless of whether the Lyons decision is legally supportable, the Lyons
opinion is not.
Section I of this Note reviews the Lyons decision, emphasizing how Justice White
deployed certain legal principles to build his opinion and deny Lyons standing for
injunctive relief. Section II then explores the lineages of those legal principles. This means
tracing each principle back through both time and jurisprudence to its original source, not
within its broader doctrinal development, but within Lyons’s particular ancestry. Section
III then summarizes what the research into those lineages reveals and discusses the
implications for federal jurisprudence. Finally, Section IV offers recommendations for
heightened jurisprudential transparency as a necessary first step in judicial reform.
I. LYONS
A. What Happened on the Street
In 1976, Adolph Lyons was pulled over by two Los Angeles Police officers because
one of his taillights was out.37 Guns drawn, the officers ordered Lyons to face his car,
As Richard Fallon has suggested, “good doctrinal Realist scholarship might help to trigger reform by
exposing concealed biases.” Fallon, supra note 30, at 1116.
35
See, infra IV. Recommendations.
36
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). See also Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A.
Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 861 (2010) (citing Hamilton and arguing that
“[f]orce of reasoning is all there is to preserve the public’s trust in the judiciary”).
37
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 114 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It must be noted that
while the burned-out taillight was the stated justification for stopping Lyons, that justification does not
necessarily account for why Lyons was stopped. As David A. Harris points out, to assert that traffic-code
violations will be used by police as pretexts to disproportionately pull over racial minorities may seem bold
and unsupported by data “because virtually no one—no individual, no police department, and no other
34
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spread his legs, clasp his hands, and place them on his head.38 Lyons complied.39 Following
a pat-down, Lyons dropped his arms.40 An officer then “grabbed Lyons’s hands and
slammed them onto his head.”41 Lyons was still clutching his keys, so they, too, slammed
into his head.42 When Lyons complained of the pain this caused him, the officer began
choking him.43 “As Lyons struggled for air, the officer handcuffed him, but continued to
apply the chokehold until he blacked out. When Lyons regained consciousness, he was
lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, and spitting up blood and dirt. He
had urinated and defecated.”44 The officers cited Lyons for the taillight and released him.45
Today, Lyons’s story is all too familiar, but, in 2021, that Lyons survived his encounter
with the police is tragically unfamiliar.46
What is also unfamiliar to us in 2021 is the relative ease with which Lyons was able
to challenge the LAPD in federal court. Today, those subjected to police violence must
show that 1) their own conduct was “innocent,” 2) the police have repeatedly violated their

government agency—has ever kept comprehensive statistics on who police stop.” David A. Harris, Driving
While Black and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 560 (1996-1997). But what data there is supports the unexceptional revelation that
“police use traffic regulations to investigate many innocent citizens; these investigations, which are often
quite intrusive, concern drugs, not traffic; and African-Americans and Hispanics are the targets of choice
for law enforcement.” Id. African Americans do not need data to tell them what they “understand quite well
already”—that they will very often be pulled over for “driving while black.” Id. at 546, 560.
38
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 115.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
“Black people in this country are acutely aware of the danger traffic stops pose to Black lives.” Jamison
v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 414 (S.D. Miss. 2020). Today, we are all too accustomed to seeing on
the news that the police, somewhere in America, have killed again. But these well-publicized killings, and
the rage they naturally elicit, are only the tip of the iceberg. Data describing the full extent of police
violence is impossible to find. In spite of legislative efforts like the Death in Custody Reporting Act of
2013, it remains unlikely that state and local law enforcement are accurately self-reporting. About the Data,
MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/aboutthedata (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
As Paul Butler suggests, “in general government officials do not seem to think the public needs to know
how many people our law enforcement officers—public servants paid by tax dollars—kill every year.”
PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 54 (The New Press ed. 2018). The inconsistency of the
data that is available and the lack of meaningful specificity in that data means that only the broadest
statistical strokes are possible. Between 2013 and 2019, for example, the average number of police killings
per year was 1091, and nearly all of the victims died by shooting. In that same time frame, there were 66
deaths from beatings or restraint, including neck restraints. Of the 1147 people killed by police in 2017,
640 were either suspected of a non-violent offense or no offense whatsoever. 149 people—only a third of
whom were white—were unarmed when the police killed them. 89 people were killed by police after being
stopped, like Lyons, for a traffic violation. National Trends, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE,
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/nationaltrends (last visited Aug. 28, 2020). Although the available data
paints an incomplete picture of the extent and nature of police violence, disturbing patterns are easily
discernible. Indeed, the fact that the picture is intentionally incomplete is in itself disturbing. “The
information about itself that a society collects—and does not collect—is always revealing about the values
of that society. We know, as we should, exactly how many police officers are killed in the line of duty. But
we do not know, as we should, exactly how many civilians are killed by the police.” BUTLER, supra, at 54.
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rights, and 3) the risk of future injury is not too speculative.47 Lyons was the last plaintiff
to challenge such police violence without having to overcome these barriers to court access
that the Lyons decision erected.48
B. The Case in Court
In February 1977, Lyons sued both the individual police officers and the City of Los
Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.49 To remedy these violations, Lyons sought monetary damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.50 Initially, the district court entered partial judgment for
Los Angeles regarding injunctive and declaratory relief.51 But the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that Lyons had standing to pursue these claims because “the threat of future injury
to not only Lyons, but to every citizen in the area” was “much more immediate” than in
distinguishable precedent on which the district court had relied.52 In support, the court
called on the “long-standing rule of equity that a case does not become moot as to the
specific petitioner . . . even if the complained-of conduct has ceased, if there is a possibility
of a recurrence . . . .”53 Under the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evading review,”
47

See Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue the Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2257, 2272–75 (2020).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to address fully Lyons’s progeny, a brief summary may
demonstrate how consequential the decision has been. Just twelve days after Lyons, the Court decided
Kolender v. Lawson, where it established a “credible” or “realistic” threat standard for cases in which,
unlike in Lyons, the challenged conduct is repeated. See Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of
Injunctive Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1101 (1987); Brandon Garrett, Standing
While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815, 1820–21 (2000);
Mank, Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s
Realistic Threat of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 837, 851 (2010). Still, Sunita Patel—UCLA
professor and former trial counsel for the plaintiffs in Floyd v. City of New York—describes in detail how,
in America today, Lyons maintains its control over attempts to enjoin abusive and brutal police practices.
Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue the Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2257, 2272–75 (2020). Patel points out
that, even as attempts are made to understand the fallout of Lyons and other cases that are critical to
structural reform litigation—Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes—it remains impossible to know how many suits have failed in the face of the barriers these
decisions have erected. Id. at 2263. Today, in actual practice, Lyons presents three such barriers: the
relative innocence of the plaintiff, whether the challenged conduct has been repeated, and whether future
injury appears too speculative. Id. at 2272. Yet, if the government has targeted a minority group, all three
barriers—innocence, repetition, and speculation—will be more easily overcome. Mank, supra, at 850, 853,
873; Garrett, supra, at 1827 (discussing Honig v. Doe, where the Court distinguished Lyons because
“individuals [were] targeted by a government policy”). But the successes are few and far between. Patel,
supra, at 2264. Lyons’ effects have been “pervasive, extending beyond the civil rights context in which
[they were] developed,” to include “alleged victims of voter intimidation, police brutality, unjustified bodycavity searches, employment discrimination, abortion clinic violence, [and] religious discrimination.”
Little, Laura E. Little, It’s About Time: Unravelling Standing and Equitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. REV.
933, 952, 935 (1993). Particularly in cases where “the Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity rules . .
. prohibit money damages[,]” Lyons has “obliterate[d] not only the most effective remedy”—injunctive
relief—“but the sole remedy.” Id. at 952–53. “The intersection of Lyons and qualified immunity rules . . .
creates an impasse not only for many victims of official misconduct, but also for the development of the
law itself.” Id. at 953.
49
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 115 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 98–99 (White, J., majority).
52
Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 615 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1980) (cleaned up).
53
Id. at 1248 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48
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Lyons’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief had to be heard in court.54 Otherwise,
the court concluded, “it is difficult to see how anyone can ever challenge police or similar
administrative practices, since usually no one can know definitely if he is going to be
subject to police scrutiny in the future.”55 Emphasizing the significance of denying
standing, the court finished by acknowledging that chokeholds may be legal, “but as long
as we refuse to allow anyone to attack their constitutionality . . . we tell the citizen that
there is no guardian of his constitutional rights.”56
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in what would become known as Lyons I,57 and
on remand, the district court determined that the City’s policy—authorizing the LAPD to
use chokeholds—must be constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.58 Concluding that the City could not “constitutionally authorize the use of such
force in situations where death or serious bodily harm is not threatened,” the district court
issued a preliminary injunction.59 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Los Angeles asked the
Supreme Court to stay that injunction until the Court could decide on a second petition for
certiorari.60 Justice Rehnquist—who had dissented in Lyons I—granted the stay, noting
that it was substantially likely that “an additional Member of th[e] Court would now join”
with the three Justices who had dissented a year earlier.61 Indeed, it is substantially likely
that Rehnquist was referring to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who—recently appointed
by President Reagan—had joined the Court just four days before Rehnquist penned the
stay order.62 A few months later, the Court granted the City’s second request for
certiorari.63
On April 20, 1983, the Court issued its opinion, holding that Lyons lacked standing
to seek injunctive relief.64 Lyons did not have the right to be heard.65 In effect, if lifethreatening chokeholds violated a constitutional right, the Article III judiciary would not

54

Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1250.
56
Id. (cleaned up).
57
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 449 U.S. 934 (1980). In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, allowed that Lyons had a “right to damages for an alleged past violation of his
constitutional rights[,]” but contended that the “threat of future injury” to Lyons was too “abstract . . . to
create the personal stake required by Art. III.” Id. at 936–37 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added). Because Lyons’s “position” could not “be distinguished from that of any
other person who may at some future date have a confrontation with the Los Angeles police[,]” White
argued, Lyons lacked “standing to press his claims for equitable relief.” Id.
58
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 118–19 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 119–20 (cleaned up).
60
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 453 U.S. 1308 (1981).
61
Id. at 1310.
62
See Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREMECOURT.GOV,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Aug. 13, 2020).
63
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 455 U.S. 937 (1982).
64
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
65
“The question is not what you have to say, but whether you can be heard to say it (that is, are you
‘standing’?)” Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1460 (1988). “What gave Mr. Lyons the ‘right’ to speak for others and insist on legality in
others’ behalf?” Id. at 1510.
55

93

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2021

participate in protecting that right. In Lyons, the Supreme Court did indeed “tell the citizen
that there is no [federal judicial] guardian of his constitutional rights.”66
On one level, this is an over-simplification. Writing for the majority, Justice White
did allow Lyons to pursue a damages remedy for past injuries.67 So Lyons did have a right
to be heard regarding the humiliating and degrading violence to which he had previously
been subjected. If the courts found that his constitutional rights had been violated, Lyons
would get paid.68 But Lyons did not have a right to be heard if he wanted to stop the police
from putting him or any other person in an unwarranted and potentially lethal chokehold
in the future.69 Nor did Lyons have a right to be heard if he did not want to live in continual
fear of repeated police brutality. And if the police wanted to keep operating under policies
that allowed such arbitrary use of lethal force, they were free to do so.70 As Justice
Thurgood Marshall noted at the conclusion of his vigorous dissent:
We now learn that wrath and outrage cannot be translated into an order to
cease the unconstitutional practice, but only an award of damages to those
who are victimized by the practice and live to sue and to the survivors of
those who are not so fortunate . . . . The federal judicial power is now limited
to levying a toll for such systematic constitutional violations.71
66

Lyons v. City of L.A., 615 F.2d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 1980). Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic
Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1952) (arguing that “when all the facts and
arguments are before a court, in a suitable case and on a suitable record, it must decide, and invariably does
decide, since a refusal to do so is a decision in favor of the constitutionality of the action being reviewed”).
67
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S 95 (1983).
68
Id. at 111, 113 (“Nor will the injury that Lyons allegedly suffered in 1976 go unrecompensed; for that
injury, he has an adequate remedy at law.”).
69
Id. at 111. But, as Paul Gowder argues, “legal injuries both supporting and stemming from stigmatized
racial identities should be understood as continuing, not isolated, injuries to every member of the class
potentially subjected” to them, and cases like Lyons, “which denied standing for injunctive relief to the
victim of a seemingly racially discriminatory chokehold, should be overruled.” Paul Gowder, Racial
Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 325, 330 (2014).
70
Lyons, 461 U.S at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet, again, as Paul Gowder contends, “if hierarchical
race itself is an injury, then all persons ascribed subordinated racial status are subject to a continuing injury
. . . [and] any standing concerns are eliminated.” Gowder, supra note 69, at 392. Lyons, Gowder argues,
“could simply have shown that he suffered a continuing injury from being a member of a class seen as fair
game for police violence—the injury of degraded status as well as its real-world consequences, such as
living in fear of the police and the social and economic consequences of disparate criminal attention.” Id.
71
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 137. Perhaps Thurgood Marshall, as the only African American on the Court, and the
only justice to mention race in his opinion, was more readily able to empathize with Lyons. Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor offers some insight into this proposition that goes beyond scholarly arguments of normative
bias: “Although all of us come to the Court with our own personal histories and experiences, Justice
Marshall brought a special perspective. His was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the
social fabric and used law to help heal them. His was the ear of a counselor who understood the
vulnerabilities of the accused and established safeguards for their protection. His was the mouth of a man
who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them a voice. At oral arguments and conference meetings,
in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life experiences,
constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal arguments but also to
the power of moral truth.” Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (1992). As Harry T. Edwards suggests, in some cases, “particularly those in
areas involving equal opportunity and discrimination, standing, and criminal law . . . black judges may
sometimes bring a unique vision to the judicial deliberative process. Because of the long history of racial
discrimination and segregation in American society, it is safe to assume that a disproportionate number of
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Without a doubt, the Lyons decision toed the literal line when it comes to Chief Justice
John Marshall’s “settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must
have a remedy,” but it seems far astray from Marshall’s further admonition that “every
injury [must have] its proper redress.”72 The Lyons decision permits the government to
provide a monetary remedy that falls far short of properly redressing the injury (if such
injuries can ever, truly, be redressed). It is to apply Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man”
vision of contracts—where a contract is simply a promise to pay for breaking it73—to the
protections afforded the American people as beneficiaries of the constitutional trust.74

blacks grow up with a heightened awareness of the problems that pertain to these areas of law.” Harry T.
Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 328 (2002). “There is a human tendency
to understand and empathize with those most like us. Judges are not exempt from this tendency, which
often leads them to best understand and appreciate the motivations of those who share their defining
attributes, such as class, gender, race, and prestige.” Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in
the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1319 (1999). “The divide between the upstanding officer, often from
the same class and race as the judge, and the marginalized victim, is typical in police brutality cases . . .” Id.
at 1325. Marshall may have presciently understood the fallout from this judicial validation of a violatenow-pay-later philosophy, for, in America today, “police brutality is so widespread, and so predictable,”
that many cities purchase insurance policies to pay damages to victims of police abuse, and police
departments are “less likely to encourage their officers to act responsibly because paying for brutality is
already included in the budget.” PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 55 (The New Press ed.
2018). See also Brandon Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1815–17 (2000) (“Obtaining equitable relief is a critical goal of litigation where police
departments are willing to ignore large damage awards rather than alter pervasive practices of police
brutality or racial profiling.”); Bandes, supra, at 1337 (noting that this focus on monetary damages in cases
like Lyons has “forced police brutality plaintiffs to file damage claims instead of seeking the appropriate
system-wide declaratory and injunctive relief”).
72
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803) (emphasis added). See Richard M. Re, Relative Standing,
102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1205 (2014) (noting that these principles relied on in Marbury “are in tension with
nonjusticiability doctrines, for the notion that federal courts should entirely abstain from remedying
particular violations of law is tantamount to saying that judges should treat the law in question as null and
void”); John C. Jeffries Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of
Fault, 88 MICH. L. REV. 82, 83 (1989) (arguing that “[t]he assumption of compensation as a universal
desideratum of the law governing official misconduct seems . . . misguided”).
73
“But what does it mean to be a bad man? Mainly . . . a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be
subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money. . . .
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it,–and nothing else.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897).
74
“The public, the collective body, has a stake in the outcome whenever the issue is whether government
has violated its charter. Each person in our society is one of the settlors and beneficiaries of the trust which
is civil government under the Lockean model. When the trustee violates the trust, each person is aggrieved.
A standing doctrine consistent with the political philosophy so important to our constitutional system
cannot fail to permit judicial challenge when the trust is broken.” Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”:
John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 52, 118 (1985). See also Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1563 (1972) (writing of Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and suggesting that Burger’s proposal
“[t]o abolish the exclusionary rule and replace it with an action for damages” would allow “the government
to buy itself out of having to comply with constitutional commands”).
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C. Justice White’s Opinion
i. Legal Principles: The Opinion’s Foundation
Under Article III a party must “alleg[e] an actual case or controversy.”75 The plaintiff
must have a “personal stake in the outcome in order to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues necessary for the proper resolution of
constitutional questions.”76 “Abstract injury is not enough”; rather, “the plaintiff must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real
and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”77
However, when equitable relief is requested, the “case or controversy considerations
obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for
equitable relief.”78 So, even where a case or controversy exists, there must still be an
“adequate basis for equitable relief[,]” which requires a “likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”79 And “past
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy . . . if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”80 In the absence of a
“sufficient likelihood” of future injury, federal courts “may not entertain a claim by any or
all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement are
unconstitutional.”81
ii. The Argument: How Justice White Built on These Principles
a. An Existing Case or Controversy
Justice White began his opinion by rejecting the notion that Lyons’s claim for
injunctive relief satisfied Article III’s case or controversy requirement.82 Any future injury
to Lyons “was not sufficiently real and immediate” to establish standing.83 Analogizing to
O’Shea v. Littleton, where a class of mostly Black plaintiffs charged two judges with
“discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law,”84 White suggested that Lyons, like the
plaintiffs in O’Shea, would “conduct [his] activities within the law and so avoid . . . the

75

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–101 (1968);
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421–25 (1969)).
76
Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Id. at 101–02 (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947); Md. Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)) (cleaned up).
78
Id. at 103 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)) (cleaned up).
79
Id. (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
Id. (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96 (1974)) (cleaned up).
81
Id. at 111 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
82
Id. at 101.
83
Id. at 103 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84
In O’Shea, “a class of plaintiffs claim[ed] . . . discriminatory enforcement of the criminal law . . . .
[when] a county magistrate and judge were accused of . . . sentencing members of [the] class more harshly
than other defendants.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102.
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challenged course of conduct . . . .”85 Because any future injury to Lyons could occur only
via an attenuated causal chain in which Lyons’s own (allegedly) illegal conduct would play
a necessary role, his future injury lacked reality and immediacy. White then buttressed his
argument with Rizzo v. Goode,86 where the Court had found that causation was “even more
attenuated” than in O’Shea because the claim relied on “what one or a small, unnamed
minority of policemen might do . . . in the future because of that unknown policeman’s
perception of departmental procedures.”87 The alleged police violence was the work of bad
apples, not departmental policy. To present a sufficient claim, White concluded, Lyons
would have to make two demonstrations.88 First, Lyons would have to show that he “would
have another encounter with the police.”89 Second, even if he could make that (all but
impossible) showing, Lyons would also have to show “either (1) that all police officers in
Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter,
whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for questioning, or (2) that the City
ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.”90 In spite of the district court’s
finding that the City of Los Angeles did, in fact, authorize the use of chokeholds in nonlife-threatening situations,91 Justice White held that Lyons’s claim was too speculative to
establish an Article III case or controversy.92
b. An Adequate Basis for Equitable Relief
Having found the threat of future injury insufficient, Justice White could have
stopped there. Instead, White further analogized to O’Shea and Rizzo to suggest that, even
if Lyons’s alleged future injury had been sufficiently real and immediate, “an adequate
basis for equitable relief” might still be lacking.93 Lyons’s claim was implicitly similar to
the claim in Rizzo: a “few instances of [constitutional] violations by individual police
officers, without any showing of a deliberate policy . . . [do] not provide a basis for
equitable relief.”94 Unless Lyons was “realistically threatened by a repetition of his
experience[,]” he could not seek an injunction.95 Given the already established “speculative
nature of Lyons’[s] claim of future injury,” equitable relief was unavailable.96 But even if
Lyons could allege the necessary “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable
injury,” he would still fail to satisfy the requirements for equitable relief because he had
“an adequate remedy at law” by way of his claim for damages.97 Failing to meet both

Id. at 103 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 497 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Rizzo, “plaintiffs alleged widespread illegal and unconstitutional police conduct aimed at minority
citizens and against City residents in general.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 103.
87
Id. at 103–04 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88
Id. at 105–06.
89
Id.
90
Id. (emphasis in original).
91
Id. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 108.
93
Id. at 103 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
94
Id. at 104 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976)).
95
Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
96
Id. at 111 (cleaned up).
97
Id. (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)) (cleaned up).
85
86
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requirements for equitable relief meant that Lyons “was no more entitled to an injunction
than any other citizen of Los Angeles.”98
c. Factors Counseling Restraint
Having denied Lyons’s claim on both equitable restraint and standing grounds,
Justice White could have, again, called it a day, but he had more work to do. In
characterizing Lyons’s claim for injunctive relief as an “invitation to slight the
preconditions for equitable relief,” White invoked several principles that “counsel[ed]
restraint.”99 First, the “need for a proper balance between state and federal authority
counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the
administration of the states’ criminal laws in the absence of irreparable injury which is both
great and immediate.”100 Second, “the normal principles of equity, comity and federalism
. . . should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state law
enforcement authorities.”101 Finally, the “federal courts,” White reiterated, “must
recognize the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable
power and State administration of its own law.”102 With these factors in mind, White
suggested that allowing federal courts to provide injunctive relief to “oversee the conduct
of law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis” would be inappropriate “absent far
more justification than Lyons [had] proffered.”103 But—with so much weighing against
Lyons—White offered this consolation: “withholding injunctive relief does not mean that
the federal law will exercise no deterrent effect”; damages remedies and criminal
prosecutions of “those who deliberately deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights”
remained available to vindicate the threatened rights.104
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: THE LYONS LINEAGE
To the extent that the [justiciability] doctrines prevent certain suits from
being brought at all, the excluded suits do not correspond to any proposed
purpose of the exclusion. We are left only with the principles’ historical
pedigree, which cannot sustain them.105
How did we get here? To answer that question, we will now consider the legal
lineages from which Lyons drew support. This is not an inquiry into each legal principle’s
doctrinal evolution. Rather, as with establishing a chain of title, we track each principle
back to its source through the cases actually cited by each generation of jurists to support
their opinions and then move forward in time back to Lyons. So, instead of tracing each
principle’s evolution at the level of the species, we follow each principle’s evolution at the
level of a single family line. Each principle has its own lineage. Some of these lineages
98

Id. (cleaned up).
Id. at 112.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951)) (cleaned up).
103
Id. at 113.
104
Id. at 112–13 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)).
105
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 121 (2007) (emphasis added).
99
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involve only a single line of cases. Others involve multiple lines meeting and intertwining
at specific points in time. This Section tracks each lineage, one principle at a time. We
begin with standing and the subordinate principles that shape it.
A. The Standing Lineage
i. An Actual Case or Controversy
Justice White’s initial proposition that a plaintiff must “alleg[e] an actual case or
controversy”106 is not itself controversial. Article III’s jurisdictional grant enumerates
“cases” and “controversies” over which the judicial power extends.107 What is
controversial, however, is what is meant by these terms.108 From an originalist perspective,
scholarship has well established that cases and controversies carried distinct meanings to
the Framers of the Constitution.109 As legal scholar Robert Pushaw has argued,
The word “controversy” supplies a textual basis for application of current
justiciability doctrines, which concern judicial resolution of bilateral
disputes, to Article III “Controversies.” However, the term “case” provides
no constitutional support for application of standing, ripeness, or mootness
to Article III “Cases,” because those doctrines ignore the key judicial
function of exposition.110
While neither the Lyons majority nor the dissent raised this distinction, it has important
implications for how Lyons’s claims were received by the Court. This is so because, in late
eighteenth century public law cases, “[a] citizen who had suffered no individualized injury
could challenge unlawful government action in a variety of ways, most commonly through
prerogative writ procedure.”111 In 1789, Lyons’s claim for damages based on past injury

106

City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–101 (1968);
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421–25 (1969)).
107
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
108
See, e.g., James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1356–57 (2015) (“Whereas the . . .
term [controversies] connotes a dispute between opposed parties (and does much of the textual work in
arguments for an adverse-party requirement), the . . . term [cases] has proved more elusive. Some scholars
have argued, despite the tendency of the Supreme Court to conflate the two terms, that the term ‘case’
confers a broader power than simply that of dispute resolution.”). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1984). But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?,
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 695, 721–23 (2004).
109
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449–50 (1994) (“In the eighteenth century, ‘case’ referred to
a cause of action requesting a remedy for the claimed violation of a legal right, in which a judge’s primary
role was to answer the legal question presented through ‘exposition’—the process of ascertaining, applying,
and interpreting the law in light of precedent and the facts presented. A dispute between parties was a
usual—but not necessary—ingredient of a ‘case,’ and resolving any such disagreement was less important
than legal exposition . . . . By contrast, ‘controversy’ meant a bilateral dispute wherein a judge served
principally as a neutral umpire whose decision bound only the immediate parties.”).
110
Id. at 450.
111
Id. at 480–81.
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would have been construed as a controversy, as it was by the Lyons Court,112 but his claim
for injunctive relief might have been construed as a case. The claims may, indeed, have
been fragmented in 1789, but not in the same fashion as they were in 1983. Assuming,
then, that the case/controversy distinction was clear at the Founding, how was that
distinction not passed down through the centuries to the Lyons Court?
The case/controversy lineage begins with the Constitution, and over the first century
of decisions, there is no indication that the terms had become indistinguishable.113 It is not
until 1887 that we find the first signs of legal mutation. In that year, Justice Stephen Field,
riding circuit in California, penned an opinion in In re Pacific Railway Commission.114
There, a district attorney sought a peremptory order to compel Leland Stanford, president
of the Central Pacific Railroad, to answer interrogatories by the Pacific Railway
Commission.115 Those interrogatories regarded whether Stanford or his company had used
federal financial aid to influence legislation or to achieve other “illegitimate or corrupt
purposes.”116 Because the court viewed the statute under which the Commission operated
as asking the Article III judiciary to exercise jurisdiction over non-judicial proceedings, the
relevant provision of the act was invalidated.117 Drawing on Chisolm v. Georgia and
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, Justice Field made the unsupported assertion that
“[t]he term ‘controversies,’ if distinguishable at all from ‘cases,’ is so in that it is less
comprehensive than the latter, and includes only suits of a civil nature.”118 Neither
Chisholm nor Osborn provides support. In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that:
[The judicial] power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted
to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then
becomes a case, and the constitution declares, that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States.119
The Chief Justice thus described the nature of a case, but Justice Field added, without
support, that the “term [case] implies the existence of present or possible adverse parties .
. . .”120 In so doing, Field began the process of conflating cases and controversies.121
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (acknowledging “that Lyons had a live
controversy with the City” that satisfied Article III).
113
The proposition passes unaltered through Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 409–11 (1792), Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 431–32 (1793), Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173–74 (1803), Osborn v. Bank of
U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1831), and Georgia v.
Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 77 (1867).
114
In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 258.
118
Id. at 255.
119
Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 819 (1824).
120
In re Pac. Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
121
See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party Requirement, and
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1422 (2015) (discussing “Justice Field’s reformulation
of the Marshall-Story definition of a ‘case,’ from one that contemplates ex parte applications to one that
requires adverse parties” and tracking how that reformulation catalyzed the “conflation of cases with
controversies”).
112
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Because the Commission’s proceedings did not fall within Field’s description, and because
the Commission was not a judicial body, Article III courts lacked jurisdiction.
Although the Supreme Court would later hold that federal courts could act to assist
an agency’s investigation,122 Justice Field’s conflation of cases and controversies
survived123 and was given Supreme Court approval in the next generation of the lineage—
Muskrat v. United States.124 Muskrat had its origins in a 1902 federal statute that allocated
land to Native American tribes.125 After passing that statute, Congress approved restrictions
on those land grants and expanded the class of persons who could share in the allotted
lands.126 Then, in 1907, Congress passed another law authorizing individual Cherokee to
bring suit in the Court of Claims “to determine the validity of any acts of Congress” that
followed the original 1902 allocation.127 David Muskrat and J. Henry Dick challenged the
validity of a statute that had expanded the “number of persons entitled to share in the final
distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees” while William Brown and Levi B. Gritts
challenged the validity of a statute that had “empowered the Secretary of the Interior to
grant rights of way for pipe lines over” lands previously granted to the Cherokee.128 Some
plaintiffs, therefore, sought to keep their allotments undiminished while others sought to
keep their property unencumbered.
But the Court never reached the merits. Because Congress had authorized the actions
in order to test the statutes’ constitutionality, the Court viewed the suits as beyond its
jurisdiction.129 In support, Justice William Day relied on Justice Field’s contention that
cases and controversies were virtually indistinguishable and that both required adversity.130
Once this jurisprudential step had been taken, it was easy to argue that the parties were not
truly adverse—since Congress had specifically authorized the suits—and hold that the
judicial power could not be exercised.131 Conflation was, therefore, an essential move in
denying the Cherokee their day in court. Without it, there would be no impediment to
hearing a friendly case designed to test a statute’s constitutionality. And this jurisprudential
move toward conflation remained undisturbed as it was passed down to the Burger Court,
where it implicitly denied Lyons his day in court.132 Were it not for Muskrat’s dramatic
Id. at 1380 (citing Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894)).
Id. at 1422.
124
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
125
Id. at 347–48; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716-720, 721.
126
Id. at 347.
127
Id. at 350; Act of Mar. 1, 1907, ch. 2285, 34 Stat. 1015, 1028.
128
Id. at 348–49.
129
Id. at 361–62.
130
Id. at 356–57. Notably, not only did the Court accept the conflation of the terms, but it also conflated the
purpose of the 1907 statute—to test the validity of other congressional statutes—with the purposes of the
individual litigants. Id. at 360 (noting that “the object and purpose of the suit is wholly comprised in the
determination of the constitutional validity of certain acts of Congress”). See James E. Pfander & Daniel D.
Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124
YALE L.J. 1346, 1422 (2015) (noting that the Muskrat Court “recited the ‘present or possible adverse
parties’ idea from Pacific Railway in the course of rejecting what it perceived as an improper attempt to
secure an advisory opinion . . . . [a]nd [that] by the middle of the twentieth century, the conflation of cases
with controversies was complete”).
131
219 U.S. at 361.
132
The Muskrat formulation was passed on to Lyons through Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway.
v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 259 (1933), Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) (per curiam), and Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 n.13 (1968).
122
123
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departure from the original meaning of cases and controversies, Lyons would have been
able to argue, at the very least, that his claim for injunctive relief presented a case through
which the federal courts would be “duty” bound to determine the constitutionality of
chokeholds in order “to say what the law is.”133
ii. Real and Immediate
In denying Lyons standing, Justice White relied on the proposition that “abstract
injury is not enough”; rather, “the plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged
official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”134 White cited four cases in support. Three of them—Golden
v. Zwickler, United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal
& Oil Co.—are rooted in the same legal lineage. The fourth—Massachusetts v. Mellon—
is the culmination of a second lineage. Within the first lineage, support breaks into two
distinct lines of cases, which intertwine in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth.135 These
distinct lineages and the lines within the first lineage are considered in turn.
a. The First Lineage: Linguistic Origins
The first line of cases begins and ends in 1850 with Lord v. Veazie.136 Indeed, when
one traces this principle through its hundreds of ancestral iterations, it is not far off the
mark to say that all roads lead to Veazie. There, faced with the problem of a potentially
“friendly” suit, Justice Roger Taney noted that “any attempt, by a mere colorable dispute,
to obtain the opinion of the Court upon a question of law . . . when there is no real and
substantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties . . . is an abuse . . .
punishable [as] contempt.”137 Within the lineage, this “real and substantial controversy”
language originates here.
The second line of cases begins with Tutun v. United States.138 In Tutun, the Court
considered whether circuit courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals to denials of
naturalization petitions.139 Critical to resolving the jurisdictional question was whether a
naturalization petition constituted “a case” within Congress’s jurisdictional grant, the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act.140 But Justice Louis Brandeis broadened the scope of the
inquiry beyond the statutory question and instead addressed whether the naturalization
proceeding satisfied constitutional jurisdiction.141 Viewing potential adversity as helping a
133

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,
109-110 (1969); United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947); Md. Cas. Co.
v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))
(cleaned up).
135
300 U.S. 227 (1937).
136
49 U.S. 251 (1850).
137
Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
138
270 U.S. 568 (1926).
139
Id. at 574.
140
Id. at 576.
141
Id. at 577. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1393–1400 (2015).
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non-contentious case find its way within the Constitution’s jurisdictional limits, Brandeis
noted that, whenever litigants pursue judicially enforceable remedies, “there arises a case
within the meaning of the Constitution . . . . [In this case] [t]he United States is always a
possible adverse party.”142 Thus, while acknowledging that a constitutional case did not
require adversity, Brandeis insinuated that a fictional adversity could further explicate how
non-contentious proceedings fit into Article III’s jurisdictional grants.
Essential to locating Tutun within the Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence is
understanding that Brandeis did not rely on potential adversity in crafting his opinion;
rather, Brandeis recognized that non-contentious proceedings like those involved in an ex
parte naturalization petition stand on their own constitutional legs.143 Although Tutun does
not ultimately provide any support for Justice White’s requirement in Lyons of “real and
immediate” injury, it demonstrates two important truths. First, Tutun shows that, as late as
1926, in spite of Muskrat, the Court understood that cases and controversies could present
distinct questions of justiciability.144 Second, Brandeis’s opinion reveals the growing
gravitational pull of the perceived necessity of adversity to Article III cases. Muskrat’s
conflation was not yet complete, but controversies were well on their conceptual way to
absorbing cases.145 Simultaneously, the Court’s justiciability doctrines were beginning to
transcend the case/controversy distinction.
Standing alongside Tutun in its importance to this line of cases is Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace.146 In Nashville, the Court heard an appeal from
the Supreme Court of Tennessee regarding whether a state excise tax constituted an asapplied violation of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.147 Because the
state action had been brought under Tennessee’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
concerns that declaratory judgments could not be reconciled with Article III’s limits on the
judicial power informed the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.148 Focusing on the nature of
the underlying dispute rather than the declaratory judgment label, the Court found
jurisdiction proper because “the case[] retain[ed] the essentials of an adversary proceeding,
involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy . . . .”149 Here originates the juxtaposition
of “real” with “hypothetical” that later evolves into Lyons’s injury language.
These two lines of cases eventually intertwine in a single generation. Developed in
decisions spanning just over a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence—from 1831 to
1933—these lines converge in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, the Court’s 1937 decision
upholding the constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act.150 There, the lines
comingle to support three justiciability principles. First, the controversy “must be definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”151
142

Id. (emphasis added).
See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party Requirement, and
Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1400–1402 (2015).
144
See id.
145
See id. at 1422.
146
288 U.S. 249 (1933).
147
Id. at 258.
148
Id. at 258–59.
149
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
150
300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937).
151
Id. (citing S. Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301 (1892); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126, 129 (1922); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487–88 (1923)) (emphasis added).
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Second, “[i]t must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.”152 Third, “[w]here there is such a concrete
case admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the
parties in an adversary proceeding . . . the judicial function may be appropriately exercised
although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of process
or the payment of damages.”153
Aetna thus fuses the demands of its ancestors. Aetna draws on Veazie for adversity
and the requirement of a “real and substantial controversy.”154 Tutun’s implied need for, at
the very least, a fictional adversity further colors the Aetna requirements.155 And
Nashville’s added qualification that a controversy be “real” and not “hypothetical” supports
Aetna’s aversion to advisory opinions based on “a hypothetical state of facts.”156 Much of
the language deployed in Lyons originates in these cases, but all of these ancestors speak
of controversies rather than of injuries. Thus, even as these lines of cases converged, their
expression in Aetna would in no way have obstructed Lyons’s access to the courts. That is
to say, in 1937, Adolph Lyons would not have faced the Burger Court’s injury
requirements. Rather, Lyons would have only needed to present a real and substantial
controversy based on real, not hypothetical, facts.
b. The Second Lineage: Controversies Become Injuries
The second lineage—which culminates in Massachusetts v. Mellon—begins in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.157 In that case, the Cherokee sought to enjoin the enforcement
of recently enacted state laws that would allow the seizure of Cherokee lands in Georgia
and abrogate all Cherokee law.158 The Cherokee argued that these state laws violated the
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation under the Constitution, numerous treaties between the
Cherokee and the United States, and federal statutes.159 Before reaching the merits, the
Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case. 160 As a starting point, Chief
Justice Marshall considered whether the Cherokee Nation should be considered a foreign
state within the meaning of the Constitution,161 which he viewed as necessary to
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Id. at 241 (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 162
(1922); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 339–40 (1926); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S.
70 (1927); New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488, 490 (1927); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S.
274, 289–90 (1928); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463–64 (1931); Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S.
286, 291 (1934); United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1935); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 324 (1936)) (emphasis added).
153
Id. (citing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 263 (1933); Tutun v.
United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576–77 (1926); Fid. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 132
(1927); Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929)) (emphasis added).
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49 U.S. 251 at 255.
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270 U.S. 568 at 577.
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Nashville, 288 U.S. at 264. For an in-depth discussion of how Nashville came to influence the earlier
Eighth Circuit decision in Aetna, see Edwin Borchard, Justiciability, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1936).
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30 U.S. 1 (1831).
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Id. at 7–8, 13–15.
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Id. at 4–8, 15.
160
Id. at 15.
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Id. at 16.
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establishing jurisdiction.162 Marshall determined that the Cherokee could not be so
regarded; rather, the Cherokee’s “relation to the United States resemble[d] that of a ward
to his guardian.”163 There is—to state the obvious—no small measure of paternalism in
that statement. In concluding remarks, Marshall commented:
If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in
which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been
inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal
which can redress the past or prevent the future.164
The Lyons language does not, however, originate in the Chief Justice’s majority
opinion, but in Justice Smith Thompson’s dissent. Justice Thompson, joined by Justice
Story, argued that the Cherokee Nation was indeed a foreign state within the meaning of
the Constitution, and although some facets of the complaint presented political questions,
he viewed the threats to Cherokee property as proper for judicial resolution: “This court
can have no right to pronounce an abstract opinion upon the constitutionality of a state
law. Such law must be brought into actual or threatened operation, upon rights properly
falling under judicial cognizance, or a remedy is not to be had here.”165 Here, in 1831, we
find the earliest ancestor of Lyons’s requirement of a “real and immediate”—rather than an
“abstract”—injury. Because the state law had indeed been brought into actual operation
against the Cherokee’s land, Justice Thompson would have reached the merits and issued
the injunction the Cherokee had requested.166 Ironically, then, while Lyons’s denial of
standing is a proper descendant of Cherokee Nation’s majority opinion denying
jurisdiction, Lyons’s language properly descends from a dissent that would have allowed
the Cherokee to be heard on the merits.
162

Id. at 20.
Id. at 17. Of course, in addition to avoiding the implications of the many agreements signed between the
United States and the Cherokee, the Court did not consider the Cherokee Nation’s self-identification as a
sovereign state. Rather, the Court set the rules by which “foreign state” would be defined. Cheryl Harris
discusses this facet of racial domination and subordination through Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,
447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978): “Beyond the immediate outcome of the case lies the deeper problem
posed by the hierarchy of the rules themselves and the continued retention by white-controlled institutions
of exclusive control over definitions as they pertain to the identity and history of dominated peoples.”
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1765–66 (1993). “When group identity
is a predicate for exclusion or disadvantage, the law has acknowledged it; when it is a predicate for
resistance or a claim of right to be free from subordination, the law determines it to be illusory.” Id. at
1766.
164
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). The consequences for the Cherokee were tragic.
Although the Court reversed course a year later in Worcester v. Georgia—finding the Cherokee Nation to
be a distinct political community over which “the laws of Georgia [could] have no force”—that decision
came either too late or with too little muscle. 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). President Andrew Jackson, who in
1830 had signed the Indian Removal Act, responded to the Court’s decision as thoroughly indifferent to his
oath of office: “The decision of the Supreme Court has fell still born, and they find that they cannot coerce
Georgia to yield to its mandate.” Baynard Woods, Jackson, Trump, Hitler and the Seeds of Global Fascism,
THE BALTIMORE SUN (May 31, 2017, 12:15PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcpnewsjackson-trump-hitler-and-the-seeds-of-global-fascism-20170531-story.html. The Cherokee were forced to
walk the Trail of Tears, Trail of Tears, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/topics/native-americanhistory/trail-of-tears (last visited Jul. 7, 2020).
165
Id. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
166
Id. at 80.
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Ninety-two years later, the Court transformed Cherokee Nation’s language in its
influential opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon.167 In Mellon, both the State of
Massachusetts and an individual litigant, Harriet Frothingham, challenged the
constitutionality of the Maternity Act, which aimed to “reduce maternal and infant
mortality and protect the health of mothers and infants” in part by awarding appropriations
to states choosing to comply with the statute.168 Although Massachusetts had chosen not to
comply, the State argued that the statute violated the Tenth Amendment by attempting to
exercise power over local government via its appropriations-inducement mechanisms.169
As an individual litigant, Frothingham argued that the Maternity Act effected an
unconstitutional taking of “property, under the guise of taxation[.]”170
The Court disposed of Massachusetts’ complaint as presenting a political question
not subject to Article III judicial power.171 In support, Justice George Sutherland drew on
Justice Thompson’s Cherokee Nation dissent: “This court can have no right to pronounce
an abstract opinion upon the constitutionality of a state law. Such law must be brought into
actual, or threatened operation upon rights properly falling under judicial cognizance, or
remedy is not to be had here.”172 To Sutherland, this language from Cherokee Nation sealed
the fate of the State suit. Yet, it also directly informed the Court’s disposal of the individual
suit. After distinguishing cases in which municipal taxpayers had obtained relief—finding
that a federal taxpayer’s interest in the federal treasury was “comparatively minute and
indeterminable”—Sutherland metamorphosed Cherokee Nation’s “actual or threatened
operation” language into the requirement that a “party who invokes the [judicial] power
must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury[.]”173 With one swift stroke of the pen, “operation” became “injury.”
Without this not-so-subtle transposition, Adolph Lyons would have faced, at the very least,
a less exclusive immediacy barrier sixty years later. The threat of unconstitutional police
violence alone, without consideration of temporal imminence, might have sustained
Lyons’s claim for injunctive relief.
c. The Lineages Converge
When the Aetna and Mellon lineages intertwined in Lyons, Justice White contended
that “[a]bstract injury is not enough”; rather, “the plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged
official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”174 Cherokee Nation’s language eschewing “abstract
opinion[s]” was reborn rejecting “abstract injur[ies].” Mellon’s transformation of Cherokee
Nation’s “actual or threatened operation” language was adopted wholesale. And Aetna’s
requirement of “real and substantial controvers[ies]” based on non-hypothetical facts was
167

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
Id. at 478–79.
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Id. at 479–80.
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Id. at 480.
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Id. at 483.
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Id. at 484 (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 75 (1831)).
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Id. at 487–88 (emphasis added).
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City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 488 (1923)).
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adapted to further clarify the nature of justiciable injuries. By 1983—through these critical
Lyons ancestors—cases had become controversies and controversies had become injuries.
And this triple conflation did not just close the courthouse doors on Adolph Lyons. It
effectively blocked citizens from challenging the use of chokeholds, and other forms of
police violence, in the federal courts.175
iii. Generalized Grievances
There remains one final principle through which Justice White justified his denial of
standing—the Court’s aversion to entertaining “generalized grievances.”176 As Justice
White argued, absent “sufficient likelihood” of future injury, federal courts “may not
entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law
enforcement are unconstitutional.”177 Although he cited three cases in support—Warth v.
Seldin, Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, and United States v. Richardson—White
could have simply cited one, for all three cases drew support from a single source—Ex
parte Levitt.178 There, three lines of caselaw intertwine.
The first generalized-grievances line begins and ends with Tyler v. Judges of the
Court of Registration.179 William Tyler had petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for a writ of prohibition to stop the court of registration from delineating the
boundaries of lots that adjoined his own.180 Tyler argued that the Massachusetts statute
granting the court of registration its authority was unconstitutional because the court was
allowed to issue conclusive decrees without notice to those whose land might be
encroached upon by the registration of adjoining lands.181 In other words, Tyler viewed the
statute as empowering the court of registration to deprive him of property without due
process.182 After the Supreme Judicial Court ruled the statute constitutional and dismissed
Tyler’s petition, Tyler appealed to the Supreme Court. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice
Henry Brown concluded that Tyler lacked the necessary interest in the case to question the
statute’s constitutionality.183 As legal scholar Steven Winter has written, the “dissenters
were astonished,” for not only had the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “not
questioned Mr. Tyler’s capacity to bring the action[,]” but such writs of prohibition had
been available to strangers in Massachusetts since 1787.184 As astonishing as was that
jurisprudential step, it is Justice Brown’s rationale that is most relevant to Lyons:
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See supra note 48, and accompanying text.
The “generalized grievances” language itself originated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
177
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
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302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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179 U.S. 405 (1900). For a thorough discussion of Tyler’s place within the evolution of generalized
grievances in standing doctrine, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1431–33 (1988).
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Tyler, 179 U.S. at 406.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 410.
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Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1431–32 (1988).
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Save in a few instances where, by statute or settled practice of the courts,
the plaintiff is permitted to sue for the benefit of another, he is bound to
show an interest in the suit personal to himself, and even in a proceeding
which he prosecutes for the benefit of the public . . . he must generally aver
an injury peculiar to himself, as distinguished from the great body of his
fellow citizens.185
Given that Tyler had, in fact, alleged a personal injury, Justice Brown seems to have gone
out of his way to articulate this broad principle. The majority could just as easily have
reached the same result by affirming the judgment below, but they chose, instead, to deny
the prerogative writ on innovative grounds.186 It is hard to ascertain whether Brown’s novel
rationale represents judicial activism or just indiscriminate jurisprudence, but the effect on
Adolph Lyons would be the same regardless. That is, by the time Tyler’s innovation
reached the Burger Court, Lyons could not claim that his request for injunctive relief sought
to protect the public at large—or even just the Black citizens of Los Angeles—from
unconstitutional police violence. Rather, Lyons was required to allege that he would
personally suffer an injury “peculiar to himself.”
The second generalized-grievances line begins, familiarly, with Cherokee Nation.187
There, in addition to denying that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state, Chief Justice
Marshall suggested that at least some of the Cherokee’s claims might also be viewed as
non-justiciable political questions.188 Responding to that suggestion, Justice Thompson’s
dissent carefully distinguished those Cherokee claims that could be viewed as presenting
political questions from those that could not: “It is only where the rights of persons or
property are involved, and when such rights can be presented under some judicial form of
proceedings, that courts of justice can interpose relief.”189 Justice Thompson’s line of
demarcation thus implicitly distinguished political rights from rights of “persons or
property[.]”
Thirty-six years later, in Georgia v. Stanton, relying heavily on Cherokee Nation, the
Court fully articulated Justice Thompson’s implication by explicitly juxtaposing civil and
political rights:
[T]his judicial power may condemn acts of men exercising political power
which work a prejudice to the rights of any juridical or natural person suing
for justice. If the rights imperilled be of a civil nature, entitled to protection
under the principles of the Constitution . . . [s]uch cases do not present
political questions . . . which the Constitution, or some valid law, intrust[]
exclusively to the one or both of the departments, commonly styled
political.190
185

Tyler, 179 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1431–33 (1988).
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30 U.S. 1 (1831); supra b. The Second Lineage: Controversies Become Injuries.
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Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. See also Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat
Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 715 (2004).
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Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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73 U.S. 50, 68 (1867) (emphasis added) (“The case, bearing most directly on the one before us, is The
Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia.”). Id. at 73.
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The Court thus clarified that distinction drawn in Cherokee Nation between political rights
and rights of persons or property by juxtaposing political rights with civil rights. The nature
of the right invaded—not whether the right was widely shared or whether the challenged
actor was political—was determinative when considering a potentially political question.
This distinction between political and civil rights was on display early in the
twentieth century in a 1903 voting rights case, Giles v. Harris.191 In Giles, the Court
considered granting equitable relief to Jackson Giles and “more than five thousand
negroes” who claimed that those sections of the Alabama Constitution that authorized the
State’s discriminatory voter registration scheme violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.192 Simultaneously, because declaratory relief was unavailable, the
complainants asked to be registered to vote under that unconstitutional registration
scheme.193 In the majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dismissed the suit on
the grounds that the claims were, essentially, mutually exclusive.194 If the Court granted
the requested relief, it would become “a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and
adding another voter to its fraudulent lists[.]”195 In the alternative, Holmes suggested that
Section 1979—ancestor of today’s Section 1983—did not necessarily encompass state
constitutions when it authorized equitable relief for constitutional violations executed
“under color of a state ‘statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.’”196 And in any
event, as a suit against the State of Alabama—in contravention of Hans v. Louisiana’s
broad assertion of state sovereign immunity—equity’s power to counter the conspiracy
perpetrated by “the great mass of the white population” was limited: “[a]part from damages
to the individual, relief from a great political wrong, if done . . . by the people of a state
and the state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of
the government of the United States.”197 While Giles did not further contribute to the
evolution of political question doctrine into a ban on generalized grievances, Giles remains
a critical Lyons ancestor to the extent that both decisions denied injunctive relief to racial
and political minorities while suggesting that damages were the only available remedy.
The third line of cases in the generalized-grievances lineage returns the discussion
again to Massachusetts v. Mellon.198 As noted earlier, Justice Sutherland’s opinion
transformed Cherokee Nation’s “actual or threatened operation” language into the
requirement that a “party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury[.]”199
191

189 U.S. 475 (1903).
Id. at 482, 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 486.
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Id. at 486.
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Id. at 484–85, 487.
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Id. at 487–88 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), in support of state sovereign immunity).
Though not directly implicated in the Lyons lineage, Justice Harlan’s dissent is noteworthy, for Harlan
would have dismissed the suit simply because it failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement then
in place, and he would have otherwise found no impediment to reaching the merits. Giles, 189 U.S. at 503–
04 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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262 U.S. 447 (1923); supra b. The Second Lineage: Controversies Become Injuries.
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Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488. But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
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Sutherland did not, however, stop there; rather, he further clarified that the “direct injury”
must be—in modern parlance—particularized. That is, a party could not invoke the judicial
power by showing “merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.”200 Mellon’s import is not, therefore, limited to how it reconstituted “operation”
as “injury.” By drawing on political-question cases to support a ban on generalized
grievances, Mellon blurred the distinction between civil and political rights. No longer
were political wrongs alone beyond the judicial power. Civil wrongs, if felt commonly
among the people, were now also beyond that power. Mellon thus borrowed from a doctrine
that had applied only to political rights—and, more critically, had explicitly not applied to
civil rights—to innovate a new principle of justiciability that would apply to both political
and civil rights. In short, what Mellon added to the language of Cherokee Nation and
Stanton swallowed up the political question doctrine.201 And within the generalizedgrievances lineage, Mellon allowed its progeny, including Lyons, to avoid the merits not
only of suits alleging political wrongs, but of those alleging civil wrongs as well.
Manifesting in Lyons, these ancestral lines allowed Justice White to state that Lyons
was “no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles.”202 Gone was
the distinction between political and civil rights. But what remained finds its closest
ancestor in Giles, where Justice Holmes had suggested that damages were all a federal
court could afford a plaintiff who seeks to enjoin unconstitutional (and racist) state
action.203 As White noted, Lyons “ha[d] a remedy for damages under § 1983.”204 In a sense,
so much had changed and so much had not changed in the eighty years separating Jackson
Giles and Adolph Lyons’s appeals to the Supreme Court.
B. The Equitable Relief Lineage
As noted earlier, once Justice White had rejected Lyons’s claim for injunctive relief
on standing grounds, the case was over. Yet, White proceeded to justify the Court’s
decision on alternative grounds. He began by stating that the “case or controversy
considerations obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a
sound basis for equitable relief.”205 So, even where a case or controversy exists, there must
still be an “adequate basis for equitable relief[,]” which requires “the likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”206
And, adding weight to these equitable principles, there were prudential factors that
“counsel[ed] restraint.”207
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262 U.S. at 488.
Indeed, Justice William Douglas expressed the common effect of—though perhaps not the relationship
between—standing and political question doctrine in his dissent to Warth v. Seldin: “Standing has become
a barrier to access to the federal courts, much as ‘the political question’ was in earlier decades . . . But cases
such as this one reflect festering sores in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one reaches
high enough and persists there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the technical barriers
and let the courts serve that ancient need.” 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113.
205
Id. at 103 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)) (cleaned up).
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i. An Adequate Basis for Equitable Relief
The story of how these principles arrived in Lyons begins in 1824 with Osborn v.
Bank of the United States.208 There, the Court considered whether a state officer could be
restrained “from performing any official act enjoined by statute.”209 It was argued that the
requested injunction could issue only “upon one of two principles: either that it was
necessary to secure . . . the enjoyment of a franchise or exclusive privilege, or to protect it
from irreparable mischief.”210 Whenever an injunction had been issued “to protect parties
in the enjoyment of a franchise,” it had been “difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the
damages.”211 With those principles in mind, Chief Justice Marshall discussed the
importance of equity operating alongside law: “The single act of levying the tax in the first
instance, is the cause of an action at law; but that affords a remedy only for the single act,
and is not equal to the remedy in Chancery, which prevents repetition, and protects the
privilege.”212 Thus, damages could issue to remedy a past violation, and equity could
intervene to protect a privilege whose violation would result in inestimable damages.
Sixty-seven years later, the Court reformulated Osborn’s view of equitable principles
in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, where a California citizen sought to enjoin Oregon state
officers from selling property to which he claimed title.213 En route to finding that the
statute under which the state officers operated unconstitutionally impaired the obligation
of contracts, Justice Joseph Lamar wrote that:
The general doctrine of Osborn v. Bank, that the circuit courts of the United
States will restrain a state officer from executing an unconstitutional statute
of the state, when to execute it would violate rights and privileges . . .
guaranteed by the Constitution, and would work irreparable damage and
injury . . . has never been departed from.214
Pennoyer’s reformulation of Osborn is marked by two important linguistic changes. First,
what had been “franchise or exclusive privilege” was broadened to “rights and privileges”
generally.215 Second, while Osborn presented two disjunctive principles as bases for
equitable relief—securing a privilege when damages are inestimable or protecting the
enjoyment of a privilege from irreparable harm—Pennoyer joined the two principles with
the conjunctive, presenting a singular basis for equitable relief. Pennoyer thus worked both
an expansion and contraction of equitable power. That is, Justice Lamar expanded what
was protected but narrowed how relief could issue.
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Almost ineluctably, Pennoyer’s reformulation of Osborn’s principles was quoted in
full in 1908’s watershed Ex parte Young decision216 before being narrowed in Fenner v.
Boykin.217 In Fenner, while declining to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute that
criminalized participation in certain commodities agreements, Justice James McReynolds
relied on the “established . . . doctrine that, when absolutely necessary for protection of
constitutional rights,” federal courts “have power to enjoin state officers from instituting
criminal actions.”218 Such injunctions could issue, McReynolds continued, only “under
extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and
immediate.”219 While the principles themselves had indeed been “established” in Young
and other cases, McReynolds’ linguistic additions would inform the Court’s analysis in
1971’s landmark federalism case, Younger v. Harris,220 where Justice Hugo Black relied
on Fenner to drive home that injunctions should issue “only under very special
circumstances” where “irreparable injury is . . . ‘both great and immediate.’”221
The final evolutionary link between Osborn and Lyons came just three years after
Younger in O’Shea v. Littleton.222 There, nineteen residents of Cairo, Illinois—seventeen
of whom were Black—had filed a class action against a magistrate and circuit court judge
for a pattern and practice of racially and financially discriminatory “administration of the
criminal justice system[.]”223 In a majority opinion by Justice White, the Court rejected the
suit because none of the nineteen plaintiffs had alleged sufficient personal injury.224 Here,
White first fashioned the language he would later quote in Lyons: “Past exposure to illegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . .
. if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”225 Because class members
would have to engage in and be prosecuted for illegal conduct to again be subjected to the
judges’ allegedly discriminatory conduct, the threat of future injury was “too remote[.]”226
The petitioners lacked standing, and Article III standing “considerations . . . shade[d] into
those determining whether [there was] a sound basis for equitable relief[.]”227 If the
requisite Article III injury was lacking, petitioners could not allege injury sufficient to
satisfy the more demanding equitable-relief standard.
Citing Younger as reaffirming equity’s demands of great and immediate irreparable
injury and inadequate remedy at law, Justice White then expanded Younger’s aversion to
216

209 U.S. 123, 152 (1908). For a thorough exploration of how equity jurisprudence evolved into Ex parte
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enjoining ongoing criminal prosecutions to include enjoining “state officers engaged in the
administration of the State’s criminal laws.”228 Even if the requirements of standing and
equitable relief had been satisfied, the Court saw the proposed injunction as “nothing less
than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly
accomplish the kind of interference that Younger . . . sought to prevent.”229 Yet, as invasive
as the lower court’s proposed injunction may have been, it would only have come into play
during criminal proceedings. Without any expansion, therefore, Younger alone could have
justified withholding injunctive relief. White’s expansion of Younger to encompass state
administrative action was, therefore, simply unnecessary to the resolution of O’Shea.230
Attentive to some purpose external to resolving the case or controversy before the Court,
and relying on the tools produced by Pennoyer and Fenner, White actively expanded the
scope of equitable restraint.
The equitable-relief lineage thus supports those charges of judicial activism levied
against the Burger Court by the likes of legal scholars Suzanna Sherry and Paul Butler.231
But, in light of the O’Shea and Lyons expansions, it is possible to more acutely focus those
charges on Justice White. In portions of his opinions unnecessary to the resolution of either
case, White alone (with the majority’s consent) reframed Younger to encompass
injunctions directed at local law enforcement.232
ii. Factors Counseling Restraint
As we have seen, after denying Lyons standing to seek injunctive relief, Justice
White unnecessarily discussed and expanded the application of equitable restraint.
Likewise, after alternatively rejecting Lyons’s claim on equitable principles, White
unnecessarily raised prudential factors counseling restraint.233 White’s invocation and
expansion of Younger provided an opportunity to expound on that federalism—“Our
Federalism”—for which Younger is widely known.234 White did so by asserting three broad
principles. First, a “recognition of the need for a proper balance between state and federal
authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in
the administration of the states’ criminal laws in the absence of irreparable injury which is
both great and immediate.”235 Second, “the normal principles of equity, comity and
federalism . . . should inform the judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state

228

Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926);
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)) (emphasis added).
229
Id. at 500.
230
Indeed, Justices Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall all dissented to this expansion, calling it
nothing more than “advisory.” Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part), 511–12 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Of course, Justice White would again deploy this expansion of Younger, and Pennoyer’s
conjunctive reformulation of Osborn, in Lyons. 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983). And again, Justice Marshall—
joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan and newcomer John Paul Stevens—would call the expansion
“advisory.” Id. at 134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
231
See supra note 22, and accompanying text.
232
See 461 U.S. at 103, and accompanying text; O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499; supra c. Factors Counseling
Restraint; infra a. A Proper Balance.
233
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111–13.
234
See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1425 (1987).
235
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 (citing O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971)).
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law enforcement authorities.”236 And third, “in exercising their equitable powers federal
courts must recognize the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.”237 The evolution of each
of these principles is addressed in turn. Taken together, however, the lineages reveal that
these principles were actively developed by a handful of Justices in cases where the rights
of political and racial minorities were usually at stake. Given that these principles evolved
in such factual contexts, it is sadly unsurprising to see them deployed against a Black man
trying to curtail unconstitutional police violence.
a. A Proper Balance
[R]ecognition of the need for a proper balance between state and federal
authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state
officers engaged in the administration of the states’ criminal laws in the
absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.238
This principle’s story begins in 1888 with In re Sawyer.239 Sawyer concerned a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus submitted by the mayor of Lincoln, Nebraska and
eleven members of the city council who had been jailed by U.S. marshals for contempt of
the U.S. circuit court.240 The jurisdictional question before the Court was whether the
circuit court, sitting in equity, had the authority to order the U.S. marshals to hold the
petitioners.241 Of course, Sawyer arose well before the merger of law and equity was
complete.242 So it is in that context that Justice Horace Gray wrote that courts of equity had
“no jurisdiction over the prosecution, the punishment, or the pardon of crimes” and “[t]o
assume such a jurisdiction, or to sustain a bill in equity to restrain” such criminal
proceedings, would be “to invade the domain of the courts of common law, or of the
executive and administrative department of the government.”243
Thirty-six years later, Justice Sutherland cited these portions of Sawyer in Packard
v. Banton to support this assertion: “The general rule undoubtedly is that a court of equity
is without jurisdiction to restrain criminal proceedings, unless they are instituted by a party
to a suit already pending before [that same court] to try the same right that is in issue
there.”244 One year later, in Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, Sutherland adjusted this
236

Id.
Id. (cleaned up).
238
Id. at 112 (citing O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 499; Younger, 401 U.S. at 46).
239
124 U.S. 200 (1888).
240
Id. at 201.
241
Id. at 209.
242
“[F]or about a century and a half after the Founding, each federal court had law and equity ‘sides,’ with
the same judge presiding over both. It is now often said that law and equity have merged in the United
States, and the decisive event in that merger is usually regarded as the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938.” Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 537–
38 (2016).
243
Id. at 210. For a discussion of how Sawyer’s rationale fits into the merger of law and equity, see James
E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1340–
41 (2020).
244
264 U.S. 140, 143 (1924) (citing Sawyer, 124 U.S. at 209–11 (1888) and Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v.
Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 217 (1903)) (emphasis added). For a brief account of the merger of law and
equity, see Pfander & Wentzel, supra note 243, at 1276.
237
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language a bit: “The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement
of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional.”245 In Hygrade, the Court was
considering a request for an injunction to enjoin criminal prosecutions which had neither
been brought nor threatened,246 so the linguistic transformation of “restrain criminal
proceedings” to “prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute” worked the expansion
necessary to encompass the requested relief. Yet, after expanding the applicability of
equitable restraint, the Court proceeded to reach the merits,247 so within Hygrade itself, the
expansion was dicta.
Half a century later, Justice White continued this expansion via linguistic
transformation in O’Shea v. Littleton, writing that the “recognition of the need for a proper
balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels restraint against the
issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the State’s
criminal laws.”248 The “proper balance” language is the child of Stefanelli v. Minard, cited
later in O’Shea, but not used in support here, and Williams v. Austrian, not mentioned in
the opinion. The Stefanelli Court had asserted that the Civil Rights Act “should be
construed so as to respect the proper balance between the States and the federal government
in law enforcement.”249 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Williams, had argued that
Congress’s “prevailing policy” was to “limit[] federal jurisdiction and preserv[e] a proper
balance between federal and State courts.”250 In O’Shea, White comingled these
propositions to create a new one—one where the Court, rather than Congress, seeks to
preserve a proper balance between both the state and federal courts and state and federal
law enforcement. While espousing federalism concerns, White blurred both federalism
boundaries and separation-of-powers demarcations, accruing power to the federal
judiciary.
These newly comingled structural principles then counseled restraint not when asked
to enjoin criminal proceedings or the enforcement of criminal statutes, but when called
upon to enjoin “state officers in the administration” of state criminal laws. Justice White
thus continued the expansion of Sawyer that Justice Sutherland had begun in Packard and
Hygrade. Taken together, these expansions wrought by Sutherland and White evince at
least a species of judicial activism on both their parts, for these expansions allowed both
Justices to reach outcomes that could not have been sustained by precedent alone.

245

266 U.S. 497, 500 (1925) (citing Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 143 (1924); In re Sawyer, 124 U.S.
200, 209–11 (1888); and Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207, 217 (1903)) (emphasis
added).
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240 (1926); and Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943)).
249
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108
(1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
250
Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 663 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

115

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2021

b. Equity, Comity, and Federalism
[T]he normal principles of equity, comity and federalism . . . should inform
the judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement
authorities.251
This principle reaches Lyons via Mitchum v. Foster, where two lines of caselaw
intertwine.252 The first line originates in Justice Harlan Stone’s 1932 opinion in Matthews
v. Rodgers.253 There, the Court considered an appeal from a district court decision
enjoining the collection of a Mississippi tax on buyers and sellers of cotton “as an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.”254 After discussing the Anti-Injunction
Act’s prohibition against federal courts entertaining suits in equity “where a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law[,]”255 Justice Stone wrote that “[t]he
reason for this guiding principle is of peculiar force” when the suit seeks “to enjoin the
collection of a state tax” in federal courts, which are “courts of a different, though
paramount, sovereignty.”256 Inferring general support from three decisions issued between
1870 and 1909, Stone then laid the foundation for Justice White’s “equity, comity and
federalism” principle:
The scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state governments
which should at all times actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance
to interfere by injunction with their fiscal operations, require that such relief
should be denied in every case where the asserted federal right may be
preserved without it.257
Three years later, in Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Insurance Association, Justice
Stone further developed the connection between federalism and equitable restraint that he
had articulated in Matthews.258 In Di Giovanni, the district court had exercised equity
jurisdiction over a suit brought by a New Jersey fire insurance company alleging that a
Missouri couple had fraudulently procured insurance policies and then conspired to defraud
the insurance company by setting fire to their own property.259 The question before the
Court was whether the circumstances of the case could sustain federal equity
251

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120
(1951); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974)) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976);
Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Pugach v. Dollinger,
365 U.S. 458 (1961)) (cleaned up).
252
407 U.S. 225 (1972).
253
284 U.S. 521 (1932). For a discussion of Matthews and Justice Stone’s role in connecting federalism
concerns to principles of equitable restraint, see Gary L. McDowell, A Scrupulous Regard for the Rightful
Independence of the States: Justice Stone and the Limits of the Federal Equity Power, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 507 (1984).
254
Matthews, 284 U.S. at 522.
255
Id. at 525 (quoting The Judiciary Act of 1789, § 16, 1 Stat. 82) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
296 U.S. 64 (1935).
259
Id. at 66–67.
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jurisdiction.260 Citing to his earlier opinion in Matthews, Stone observed that federal courts,
sitting in equity, should give “scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state
governments and a remedy infringing that independence . . . should be withheld if sought
on slight or inconsequential grounds.”261 Finding the threatened injury to the insurance
company to be “of too slight moment,” the Court rejected the assertion of federal equity
jurisdiction.262 By adding the “slight or inconsequential grounds” language to his own
Matthews formulation, Stone thus perfectly queued up his resolution of Di Giovanni and
further interwove those concepts of federalism and equitable restraint that would eventually
reach the Burger Court’s decision in Lyons. Indeed, as some have argued, Stone was a
devout proponent of deploying federalism to justify equitable restraint, 263 and that is
precisely the role Stone plays in the prudential-factors lineage.
The second line of cases originates—unsurprisingly—in Younger v. Harris.264
Justice Hugo Black’s discussion of equity, comity and federalism in Younger casts long
shadows over Mitchum and, by extension, Lyons. There, Black suggested that equitable
restraint’s “fundamental purpose . . . [is] to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and
avoid” unnecessarily duplicative legal proceedings.265 Yet, “an even more vital
consideration [is] the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition” that the United States is comprised “of separate state governments,” and “the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”266 This notion of comity is
“Our Federalism,” which represents:
[A] system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both
State and National Governments, and in which the National Government,
anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere
with the legitimate activities of the States.267
These conceptions of equity, comity, and federalism, though long present in federal
jurisprudence, favored abstention in Younger because good-faith criminal proceedings
were pending in state court and enjoining such proceedings would constitute an
inappropriate “veto over the [state’s] legislative process.”268 Regardless, then, of how
broadly Justice Black may have articulated “Our Federalism,” federalism’s influence in
Younger only reached so far as to counsel restraint in enjoining already initiated criminal
proceedings in state court and in construing state statutes outside the confines of an Article
III case or controversy.
260

Id. at 68.
Id. at 73 (citing Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185 (1935) and Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S.
521 (1932)) (emphasis added).
262
Id. at 74.
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See Gary L. McDowell, A Scrupulous Regard for the Rightful Independence of the States: Justice Stone
and the Limits of the Federal Equity Power, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 509 (1984).
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401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Id. at 44.
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The following year, the Court relied on both Matthews and Younger in Mitchum v.
Foster.269 In the majority opinion—which held that Section 1983 came within exceptions
to the Anti-Injunction Act—Justice Potter Stewart took care to acknowledge the
importance of Younger’s principles: “we do not question or qualify in any way the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked
to enjoin a state court proceeding.”270 Thus summarizing Younger, Stewart fashioned the
“equity, comity, and federalism” language. Yet, drawing on both Younger and eight other
cases that demonstrated how the Court had “emphasized . . . [these principles] many times
in the past[,]” Justice Stewart implied that Younger had not effected any grand expansion
of federalism’s influence on equitable restraint.271 By interweaving the earlier decisions in
the Matthews line of cases with Younger, Stewart obscured the relevance of those preYounger decisions. Matthews certainly acknowledged the importance of the “rightful
independence of state governments” generally, but it—and the earlier decisions from which
it drew support—were focused on “a proper reluctance to interfere . . . with [state] fiscal
operations.”272 Thus, in a case where the Court reinforced the power of the Civil Rights
Act to authorize coercive relief, Younger’s broad aversion to federal intervention in state
court proceedings eclipsed the more narrow conceptions of equitable restraint that had
informed the Court’s pre-Younger decisions.
In Lyons, Justice White did not cite to Younger to support his proposition that “the
normal principles of equity, comity and federalism . . . should inform the judgment of
federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities.”273 Instead,
drawing on the more obfuscatory opinion, White cited to Mitchum.274 But Younger is the
only case in the lineage from which White could find support. Though Younger was
focused on injunctions directed at state court proceedings, Justice Black’s discussion of
federalism deployed language that was broad enough to encompass injunctions aimed at
“state law enforcement authorities.” Regardless then of what Younger expressed about
federalism, Lyons could not help but work an expansion of federalism’s influence on
federal courts because the principles of equity, comity and federalism had never before
been invoked in a context like that of Lyons. As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in
dissent, “[w]hatever the precise scope of the Younger doctrine, the concerns of comity and
federalism that counsel restraint when a federal court is asked to enjoin a state criminal
proceeding simply do not apply to an injunction directed solely at a police department.”275
Marshall drew support for this assertion not only from Younger, but also from Steffel v.
Thompson.276 There, Justice Brennan had distinguished Younger on the grounds that the
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407 U.S. 225 (1972).
Id. at 226, 236–37, 243 (1972) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Fenner v. Boykin, 271
U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 312 U.S.
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“principles of equity, comity, and federalism ‘have little force in the absence of a pending
state proceeding.’”277
Ignoring Steffel, Justice White chose not to acknowledge this distinction or the
expansion he was working in Lyons. Rather, like Justice Stewart in Mitchum, White seems
to have been intent on presenting Younger’s principles as time-tested and invariable. Yet,
the lineage reveals that they had not been nearly so broadly entrenched in Supreme Court
jurisprudence as White suggested. More than any other facet of the opinion, White’s subtle
addition of the word “normal” to the Mitchum formulation speaks to this effort to normalize
the Younger doctrine even as Lyons significantly expanded the Court’s deference to those
principles. The lineage thus reveals a joint—though several—project on the part of Justices
Stone and White to significantly expand federalism’s influence over equitable restraint.
c. A Special Delicacy
In exercising their equitable powers federal courts must recognize the
special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable
power and State administration of its own law.278
Justice White’s third principle represents the intertwining of two distinct lines of
caselaw. The first line is fully embodied in Stefanelli v. Minard,279 where the specific
language was fashioned. The second line begins with broad federalism concerns in Mayor
v. Educational Equality League280 and evolves in Rizzo v. Goode.281
In Stefanelli, the Court considered whether a federal court could enjoin a state
criminal proceeding from admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.282 Without much ado, Justice Frankfurter held that “the federal courts should
refuse to intervene in State criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when
claimed to have been secured” illegally.283 In support, Frankfurter expressed how
federalism concerns influenced equitable restraint: “The special delicacy of the adjustment
to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law,
has been an historic concern of congressional enactment.”284 Although this language does
not express any concept distinct from those embodied in the cited caselaw, Frankfurter
drew linguistic inspiration from Justice Holmes’ opinion in Sacco v. Massachusetts:
Mr. Justice Holmes dealt with this problem in a situation especially
appealing: ‘The relation of the United States and the Courts of the United
Id. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)).
Id. at 112 (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
500 (1974)) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976); Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963);
Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961)) (cleaned up).
279
342 U.S. 117 (1951).
280
415 U.S. 605 (1974).
281
423 U.S. 362 (1976).
282
342 U.S. at 117–18.
283
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284
Id. at 120–21 (citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 401 (1941), Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50
(1941), Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935), Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926),
Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926), Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926), and
Maryland v. Soper (No. 3), 270 U.S. 44 (1926)) (cleaned up).
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States to the States and the Courts of the States is a very delicate matter that
has occupied the thoughts of statesmen and judges for a hundred years and
can not be disposed of by a summary statement that justice requires me to
cut red tape and to intervene.’285
In Sacco, Justice Holmes considered—and rejected—a request to stay Sacco’s
imminent execution until the full Supreme Court could consider his application for relief.286
Holmes defended his denial by noting that “[f]ar stronger cases than this have arisen with
regard to the blacks when the Supreme Court has denied its power.”287 Specifically, Sacco
argued that Judge Thayer, who had presided over the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, was
prejudiced against them.288 Thayer had, indeed, made public statements that supported this
assertion.289 After Holmes denied the stay, the men were put to death in what would
become “the most famous wrongful execution case” in United States history, but when
Frankfurter penned his Stefanelli opinion, the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti had not yet
become so widely regarded as wrongful.290 It is thus unsurprising that Frankfurter may
have found the Sacco case “especially appealing[,]”291 and therefore chose to echo Holmes’
“delicate” language.292 Yet, by the time Justice White relied on Stefanelli in Lyons, the
Sacco decision should not have seemed quite so “appealing.”293 Had Stefanelli adequately
contextualized the “special delicacy” principle, or had White reinvestigated the contextual
strength of that principle, he might not have so cavalierly relied on it. Then again, perhaps
White would have found contextualization through Sacco contrary to the racialsubordination project in which Paul Butler suggests he was engaged.294 Either way, for
want of interrogating the principle and transparently presenting its origins, the most famous
wrongful execution in U.S. history—and an opinion laced with racism—had left another
loaded weapon lying around in Supreme Court jurisprudence, and White deployed it to
fortify his arguments against Lyons.
The second line of cases begins less than a decade before Lyons in Mayor of City of
Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League.295 The Mayor case came before the Court
after the Third Circuit granted the Educational Equality League injunctive and declaratory
relief against the Mayor of Philadelphia for “violat[ing] the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against Negroes in appointments to” the
Philadelphia Board of Education.296 After first finding that the Mayor’s appointments
285
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constituted an exercise of executive discretion for which the Mayor could be held
accountable “only at the polls[,]” Justice Lewis Powell, stated, in dicta, that there were
“also delicate issues of federal-state relationships underlying [the] case.”297 Whatever those
issues were, they did not come into play in Mayor, for the Court decided the case “on an
absence of proof.”298
Two years later, however, Justice Rehnquist relied on the Mayor dicta in Rizzo v.
Goode to expand the application of federalism principles beyond requests to enjoin state
court action and into requests to enjoin local law enforcement.299 In denying injunctive
relief to rectify a “pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police
officers . . . against minority citizens[,]” Rehnquist asserted that the Civil Rights Act
remained subject to federalism principles:
[T]he principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments,
though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in
cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have
not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding
itself.300
The Mayor dicta thus helped to work Rizzo’s expansion of federalism to encompass
injunctions directed at police officers. And while White would contend in Lyons that “no
extension” of Rizzo was necessary to deny injunctive relief, that claim was—as Justice
Marshall argued in dissent—“simply disingenuous.”301 Neither equitable restraint nor
federalism concerns had yet applied to a case in which a plaintiff who had already suffered
unconstitutional injury subsequently sought to enjoin the local law enforcement practices
that had caused that injury.302
What is most disconcerting about this “special delicacy” lineage are the factual
contexts through which both the language and the underlying principle were developed.
The Sacco opinion—laced with racism and abdicating power to stay what would ultimately
be revealed as a wrongful execution—spawned the language. And all three cases that
worked the expansion of federalism concerns—Mayor, Rizzo, and Lyons—rejected the
requests of minority citizens to enjoin unconstitutional conduct by local executive actors.
This facet of the “special delicacy” lineage distinguishes it, dubiously, from the “proper
balance” and “equity, comity, and federalism” lineages. While those lineages are marked
by the judicial activism of Justices Stone, Sutherland, and White, the “special delicacy”
lineage suffers from both White’s judicial activism and an ancestry of arguably racist
import. And all three lineages reveal how quickly the factual contexts and origins of legal
principles can be obfuscated. Indeed, when no effort is made to contextualize and
transparently present the legal foundation on which a decision is rationalized, it is logically
conceivable that the only possible outcome will be obfuscation. Like the Lyons majority
297
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opinion, judicial opinions which do this are, in Justice Marshall’s words, “simply
disingenuous.” And such disingenuousness erodes the legitimacy of the federal judiciary.
iii. Other Remedies
After rejecting Lyons’s claim on standing, equitable-restraint, and federalism
grounds, Justice White offered this consolation:
[W]ithholding injunctive relief does not mean that the federal law will
exercise no deterrent effect in these circumstances. If Lyons has suffered an
injury barred by the Federal Constitution, he has a remedy for damages
under § 1983. Furthermore, those who deliberately deprive a citizen of his
constitutional rights risk conviction under federal criminal laws.303
This deterrence concept—which, incidentally, has been largely gutted through the
doctrine of qualified immunity304—originates in the Court’s 1961 decision in Monroe v.
Pape.305 There, thirteen Chicago police officers had broken into the home of a Black family
“in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room,
and ransacked every room,” after which Mr. Monroe was detained at a police station for
ten hours and interrogated without access to an attorney or his family.306 After canvassing
the history of the Civil Rights Act from its origins in the Ku Klux Klan Act, Justice William
Douglas concluded that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear such a complaint under
Section 1983.307 In so holding, Justice Douglas’s concern for the availability of alternative
remedies focused on whether the existence of state common law remedies should preclude
redress under Section 1983.308 But The Civil Rights Act, Douglas determined, had been
designed to provide a federal remedy “where state law was inadequate.”309 More pointedly,
the Act sought “to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in
theory, was not available in practice.”310 On these findings, Justice Douglas determined
that “[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy[.]”311 In other words, with
regard to violations of The Civil Rights Act, other remedies were very conceivably
inadequate. Thus, had a citizen like Adolph Lyons brought suit against local law
enforcement in 1961, the Court would not have suggested that other remedies would
Id. at 112–13 (majority opinion) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)) (cleaned up).
Particularly in cases where “the Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity rules . . . prohibit money
damages[,]” Lyons has “obliterate[d] not only the most effective remedy”—injunctive relief—“but the sole
remedy.” Little, supra note 7, at 952–53. “The intersection of Lyons and qualified immunity rules . . .
creates an impasse not only for many victims of official misconduct, but also for the development of the
law itself.” Id. at 953.
305
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adequately replace federal injunctive relief as a deterrent to unconstitutional police
violence. Rather, providing such injunctive relief would have been viewed as essential to
protecting civil rights.
Five years later, however, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, the Court relied on
Monroe when it rejected an attempt to remove state criminal prosecutions to federal
court.312 State criminal charges had been brought against twenty-nine people who had been
involved in civil rights activities in Mississippi.313 Those charged claimed that the courts
of Mississippi “were prejudiced against them because of their race or their association with
Negroes” and were engaged in a “declared policy of racial segregation.”314 Consequently,
they sought to remove to federal court, and the Court was faced with questions “concerning
the scope of the civil rights removal statute.”315 After construing two statutory provisions
as incapable of sustaining removal,316 Justice Stewart defended that resolution: if those
charged had been subjected to “an outrageous denial of their federal rights,” other remedies
would enable the federal courts to redress those wrongs.317 Supreme Court review and
“many other remedies” would be available should the state courts fail to vindicate any
federal rights.318 In dissent, Justice Douglas cautioned that, rather than “tak[ing]
considerable comfort from the availability . . . of numerous other federal remedies,” the
majority should not forget “when these alternative remedies were conferred.”319 All of
these remedies were made available between 1866 and 1871, when Congress was
particularly concerned that state courts would fail to vindicate federal civil rights.320 Had
the majority so desired, the statutory removal provisions could have been read in concert
with these other congressional enactments; that is, they could have been read in the context
in which they were enacted. As Douglas saw it, the many remedies Congress had created
were designed to work together to protect civil rights. But Justice Douglas spoke only in
dissent, and for plaintiffs like Lyons, such a comprehensive remedial scheme was
beginning to fracture.
Less than a decade later, Justice White would rely on Peacock in O’Shea v. Littleton,
where he would further the idea that those remedial schemes enacted by the Reconstruction
Congresses would retain their potency when segregated.321 In denying injunctive relief to
the “17 black and two white residents of Cairo” for want of standing, White echoed the
defensive language of Peacock and penned the broader language he would later quote in
312
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Lyons: “Nor is it true that unless the injunction sought is available federal law will exercise
no deterrent effect in these circumstances. Judges who would willfully discriminate on the
ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights
must take account of” potential criminal fines and imprisonment, as well as civil liability
from which official immunity would not shield them.322 While this may have still carried
some truth in 1974, since Pierson v. Ray had innovated only a modest form of qualified
immunity just seven years prior, by the time White restated the principle in Lyons, law
enforcement had indeed been “shielded”—just one year earlier—under Harlow v.
Fitzgerald.323 That is, once qualified immunity acquired its post-Harlow potency, the
availability of civil liability would no longer counter-balance the unavailability of equitable
relief.324
There are two striking features to the “other remedies” lineage. First, we may notice
how Monroe’s juxtaposition of state and federal remedies—deployed to sustain the federal
remedy—was repackaged to justify withholding federal remedies. Second, we must
recognize that the entire “other remedies” jurisprudence developed in suits alleging racial
discrimination. Yet, White acknowledged none of this in his Lyons opinion, and that failure
to acknowledge the factual crucibles in which these principles developed presents one of
the more pervasive and dangerous problems with our jurisprudence, to be discussed further
in the following two Sections.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The Lyons ancestry shows us how past Supreme Courts enabled the Burger Court to
close the courthouse doors on Adolph Lyons and allow the continued use of chokeholds.
Principles developed in specious, obfuscatory, and activist Supreme Court opinions lay
ready—preserved both innocuously and insidiously—for White to deploy against Lyons.
Considering the plaintiffs and outcomes in cases like Muskrat, Cherokee Nation,
Giles, O’Shea, Sacco, Mayor, Rizzo, and Peacock, those charges of racism leveled against
the Burger Court by the likes of Paul Butler can be seen systemically at work in the Lyons
lineages.325 Likewise, when one considers the plaintiffs and outcomes not only in those
cases, but also in cases like In re Pacific Railway Commission and Nashville, those lineages
reveal an elitist protection of privilege and power noted by the likes of Gene Nichol and
Steven Calabresi.326 And they reveal that the supermajoritarian paternalism of which
Suzanna Sherry writes is not limited to the Burger Court, but—as evidenced by cases as
old as 1831’s Cherokee Nation—is deeply ingrained in Supreme Court jurisprudence.327
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And throughout the Lyons ancestry, the normative biases of Justices past are preserved in
the rationales of Justices present.328
While this may not necessarily be true for every Supreme Court decision, its
manifestation in the jurisprudence that bore Lyons should give us “pause” and encourage
us “to review our principles.”329 This Note does not suggest that any of our jurisprudence
should be discarded out of hand as irremediably tainted. Nor does it suggest that all
Supreme Court decisions are, like Lyons, built on sand. Rather, this Note suggests that
decisions like Lyons—arguably “wrong” in their own right—cannot be made “right” if the
seemingly sound legal principles upon which they rest are left unexamined, and certainly
not if they are obscured. Tear down Lyons, but pay no heed to its foundational sand, and
whatever else is built on those principles will founder. Those doubtfully forged weapons
remain and will again find willing hands. For whether we might join to overturn cases like
Lyons on what are essentially normative grounds (i.e. because the decision encourages
police violence and the Court refused to listen to a Black man), for constitutional reasons,
or for the majority opinion’s own jurisprudential missteps, the distorted principles
underlying Lyons would remain. Not all “loaded weapons” look like weapons. Not all
dangerous legal principles cry out in normative terms to be overruled or abandoned. We
must pay just as close, if not closer, attention to the seemingly settled and “neutral”
principles that, when put together, construct a loaded weapon. To address these, this Note’s
suggestion is modest: greater transparency in jurisprudence.
Critical to promoting the kind of transparency that might encourage systemic reform,
we must “review our principles” relating to the discussion and citation of supporting
caselaw. Not only does the lineage present another vantage point from which we may
discern why the Lyons decision was wrong, but it should also encourage us to question how
we interrogate legal principles and weigh different facets of precedent. Many scholars have
argued that Lyons was wrongly decided and should be overruled, and to their chorus, this
Note adds yet another voice. Yet, this Note seeks not only to help reopen the courthouse
doors to people harmed by police violence, but also to demonstrate the value of embracing
jurisprudential methodologies that refuse to consider legal principles stripped of their
factual and political contexts. This Note does not suggest a radical departure from our
existing methodologies; rather, it suggests that subtle shifts in how we present and argue
legal principles will promote a radical improvement in judicial transparency. But before
discussing that more thoroughly, let us review what the research itself reveals vis-a-vis
Adolph Lyons and the Supreme Court.
A. The Standing Lineage
The Lyons decision, while relevant to other areas of law, remains critical to whether
a plaintiff has standing to seek injunctive relief.330 What the lineage reveals is that Lyons
himself may have had standing were it not for a handful of jurisprudential ancestors. Were
it not for Muskrat, Lyons’s request for injunctive relief might have survived as an Article
III case, rather than failing as an Article III controversy.331 Were it not for Cherokee Nation,
328
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Lyons’s claim of future injury might have been seen as sufficiently real and immediate.332
And were it not for Cherokee Nation, Tyler, and Mellon, Lyons’s claim might not have
been discounted as a generalized grievance.333 Without the pivotal changes these decisions
worked, Justice White would have had to break far more new ground than he did when he
fragmented the standing inquiry. Without the tools left lying about in those earlier opinions,
White might not have been able to weaponize standing doctrine against Adolph Lyons. Just
as Lyons—with all it has to teach us about systemic racism, police protectionism, elitism,
over-glorified individualism, and supermajoritarian paternalism—is alive and well in 2021,
so too these critical cases live and breathe in Lyons. Lyons is their progeny, and they are,
largely, not ancestors of which any should be proud.
Muskrat well exemplifies how jurisprudential principles cannot be divorced from the
context in which they were developed. The conflation of cases and controversies that
helped the Muskrat Court avoid reaching the merits of the Cherokee’s claims was used to
deny a historically oppressed racial and political minority the right to be heard to the
advantage of the economically, politically, and racially privileged. And the Muskrat
decision smells of the same supermajoritarianism Suzanna Sherry identified in Lyons, for
the Muskrat Court actively rejected Congress’s attempts to rectify those wrongs already
inflicted on the Cherokee. Nor was In re Pacific Railway Commission—where Justice Field
fashioned the Muskrat conflation—free from elitist bias. Speaking to such elitism, Gene
Nichol has observed that the federalism concerns that counseled restraint in Lyons “melted
away” in Bush v. Gore because “George W. Bush is not Adolph Lyons.”334 It may just as
truly be said that Adolph Lyons is not Leland Stanford. And while the Court overturned In
re Pacific Railway Commission, it did not discard that decision’s conflation of cases and
controversies. Rather, the Court embraced that conflation, deployed it against the
Cherokee, and passed it on to Lyons.
Cherokee Nation likewise demonstrates how legal principles, by surviving the
ugliness of their conceptions, can still carry that ugliness with them in the jurisprudence of
future Courts. Cherokee Nation’s “actual or threatened” language, rephrased in Mellon, is
the direct ancestor of the Lyons injury formulation. Authored by Justice Thompson in
dissent, that language was fashioned to argue against silencing a racial and political
minority, against Chief Justice Marshall’s paternalistic framing of the Cherokee-United
States relationship as that of a “ward to his guardian,”335 and against the unconstitutional
taking of property. And although Thompson’s arguments should have been vindicated by
the Court’s about-face in Worcester v. Georgia, they were undone when the language
survived Cherokee Nation and was repackaged to silence another racial and political
minority—Adolph Lyons. The ugliness, though long forgotten (at least largely by
privileged majorities), inheres to the “loaded weapon,” always ready to reveal itself.336
The generalized-grievances lineage is no less disturbing. Categorically, it supports
the idea that the Court has actively sought to restrict court access by demanding
personalized injury.337 First, the majority opinion in Tyler embarked on an astonishing
332
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departure from the settled and original practice of affording strangers writs of
prohibition.338 While that departure was an innovation unnecessary to Tyler’s resolution,
Tyler went on to form much of the bedrock upon which myriad decisions would build when
refusing to reach the merits of constitutional claims.339 Mellon’s absorption of political
question doctrine forms the rest of that bedrock.340 While Mellon depended on Cherokee
Nation’s suggestion that some violations of Cherokee rights might present political
questions,341 that suggestion did not decide the case. The racism, elitism, and paternalism
that inhered to Cherokee Nation did, however, survive to fight another day in Giles’s
refusal to enjoin racially discriminatory voting laws.342 And although Mellon’s subsequent
expansion of the principle to encompass civil as well as political rights occurred in the
arguably innocuous context of preventing a challenge to a Progressive federal statute aimed
at protecting the health of mothers and infants, that expansion lay ready, like one of Justice
Jackson’s “loaded weapon[s],”343 for the Lyons Court to pick up. When Tyler’s contraction
of third-party standing combines with Mellon’s expansion of political question doctrine
into a ban on generalized grievances pertaining to civil rights, the result is the closing of
the courthouse doors to those like Lyons who just might be motivated by altruism, rather
than particularized self-interest.344 Cherokee Nation’s dicta and Tyler’s rejection of
stranger suits—both unnecessary to the resolution of those cases—became necessary tools
in silencing Lyons.
B. The Equitable Relief Lineage
Although unnecessary to the Lyons decision, Justice White’s equitable-restraint
dicta—including federalism concerns and the notion that “other remedies” will deter
violations of constitutional rights—builds on Court decisions that deserve greater scrutiny.
The better part of those cases in which these principles were developed is marked by what
can only be recognized as an obfuscatory species of judicial activism. Justices Stone,
Sutherland, White, and, to a lesser extent, Rehnquist reveal themselves as the primary
architects of a federalism-fueled version of equitable restraint. What Paul Butler has
described as “a project by the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts to expand the power
of the police against people of color[]” may be more broadly framed as the reality of
Supreme Courts past and present.345 Certainly, Justice White’s activist involvement cannot
be overstated. In O’Shea, White began an unnecessary—an activist—expansion of both
equitable restraint and federalism’s influence, and he continued that expansion in Lyons.346
338
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Taken alongside Justice Rehnquist’s expansion of federalism’s influence in Rizzo, White’s
efforts fortify the view that the Burger Court played a major role in this “project.” 347 Yet,
the Burger Court’s contributions were built on those expansions worked by at least two
other “Courts”—those led by Chief Justices Taft and Hughes. The expansion of federalism
concerns worked by Justice Sutherland in the mid-1920s generated the caselaw on which
Justice White would later rely.348 Likewise, Justice Stone’s efforts to promote federalism
in the early 1930s offered White the tools with which to normalize the principles of “equity,
comity and federalism.”349 When Adolph Lyons requested injunctive relief, his appeal was
heard not only by the Burger Court, but by these crucial earlier Courts as well. It was not
only Justices White, Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor who denied Lyons’s claim.
Justices Sutherland and Stone were still very much sitting in judgment on the bench. To be
clear, this point should in no sense be perceived as an assault on the ideal of federalism
itself—which is a vital component of our structural Constitution—but only as a rejection
of judicial activism cloaked in the language of federalism, particularly when deployed
against minorities of any kind.
Yet, the equitable-relief lineage is not only marked by judicial activism (or a lack of
judicial restraint). It is also seeded with racism. The “special delicacy” language finds its
origins in Sacco, where Justice Holmes blithely refers to “the blacks” while denying a stay
of execution.350 And Mayor, Rizzo, and Lyons expanded the influence of that articulation
of federalism while rejecting claims of racial discrimination in city appointments, racial
discrimination by local law enforcement, and unconstitutional police violence that
disproportionately impacted minorities.351 Such suspect decisions denying relief to those
alleging race-related constitutional violations define the Court’s rejection of Monroe in
Peacock, O’Shea, and Lyons.352 Those opinions worked hard to defeat the connection
between federal remedies and the Civil Rights Act that Justice Douglas had carefully (and
correctly) established in Monroe.353 And they succeeded against his dissent in Peacock and
against his further admonitions in cases outside the Lyons lineage like Terry v. Ohio, where
Douglas wrote that “[t]here have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history
that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police
the upper hand.”354 As the Lyons ancestry reveals, those pressures have indeed been at play
in Supreme Court decisions “throughout our history.” And those pressures do not evaporate
when the Justices change or public sentiment evolves; rather, they continue to exert their
influence on the Court through seemingly neutral legal principles that were forged when
past Courts capitulated to those very pressures.
347
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This is, again, not to diminish the role of the Court that actually hears a particular
case. Despite the pressures of Courts past, those Justices writing in the present have choices
to make. To pick up or let lie the loaded weapon—that is the question. And, regardless of
the answer, to do so transparently. But there are also normative choices to make between
competing precedential lineages. For example, both Monroe—where Justice Douglas
sought to return the federal courts to their congressionally intended role in defending civil
rights—and Giles—where Justice Holmes allowed “the great mass of the white population”
to run roughshod over the Constitution—were ancestors of Lyons.355 And Justice White
decidedly chose to honor Giles rather than Monroe. Just as Holmes suggested that federal
courts could only provide a damages remedy to rectify a “great political wrong,” so White
made clear that damages were all the relief the federal courts would provide to redress a
great and pervasive civil wrong.356 We can, and we must, make better normative and
jurisprudential choices. And we can, and we must, recognize that even the most seemingly
inoffensive legal principles can be weaponized. And truly, as a matter of first principles,
regardless of the doctrinal choices, we must transparently explain and justify our decisions.
We must not allow judicial opinions to hide the law.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As John Hart Ely contended just three years before Lyons, representative democracy
malfunctions “when the process is undeserving of trust, when . . . the ins are choking off
the channels of political change . . . .” 357 With regard only to the Lyons decision, the lineage
reveals that the process whereby the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was forged is very
much “undeserving of trust,” for that process built on principles developed by arguably
racist, elitist, paternalist, and speciously activist Courts. The Lyons decision cannot be
separated from those decisions underlying its rationale. And the result in Lyons can very
aptly be called one whereby “the ins” choked off one channel of political change—the
federal courts. The very nature of the jurisprudence that led to Lyons should elicit distrust.
And the Lyons majority opinion, by “disingenuously” framing what the law had been in
order to change what the law is, should elicit similar distrust.
Both because the jurisprudence on which Lyons was built cannot be trusted and
because the real-world ramifications of the Lyons decision translate into an enhanced
protection of unconstitutional police violence—particularly that which is directed at Black
and Brown individuals and communities—Lyons should be overturned and the import of
its progeny abandoned. Advocating for a rejection of Lyons is, however, but one purpose
of this Note.
The other is to encourage increased transparency in the judiciary and legal
profession. Only through devotion to transparently stating the law can we avoid outcomes
like that in Lyons. Achieving transparency begins with recognizing that some of our current
methodologies are flawed. For example, judicial opinions will often cite to a recent
controlling case that supports a legal principle. Such cases, like those cited by the Lyons
majority, are often far removed from the original source of the principle—the case that first
fashioned and announced it—and often far removed as well from later cases that
355
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fundamentally altered the principle. By citing to more recent caselaw that simply parrots,
and sometimes distorts, the original principle and fails to attend to its historical evolution,
we obfuscate the factual and political contexts through which the principle was born and
developed. In so doing, we unconscientiously reinforce systemic problems. Surely there is
a great deal of our Supreme Court law that is not built on principles developed in such
doubtful contexts as those found in Lyons’s ancestry, but we cannot know unless we look.
And, more broadly, the people cannot know unless jurists are thorough and rigorous in
their opinions.
Contextualizing legal principles by understanding how and when they were born or
evolved is critical to assessing the merits of both Court decisions and generally accepted
legal principles. Once the inquiry has been made and a principle’s context laid bare—once
transparency has been achieved—we can make an informed decision to either repudiate
the principle or reaffirm it. Conversely, when we continue to affirm principles without
regard for the factual and political crucibles in which they were forged, we ignorantly
reaffirm any systemic problems that might inhere to those principles. Some jurists already
embrace such contextualization and the transparency it engenders, but we need jurists to
broadly embrace this jurisprudential power. The legitimacy—or perceived legitimacy—of
our judiciary is at stake.
A recent district court opinion, Jamison v. McClendon,358 should inspire us to
embrace this form of transparency and the species of judicial activism that it represents. In
Jamison, Judge Carlton Reeves granted qualified immunity on a motion for summary
judgment relating to an unconstitutional search of a Black man’s vehicle during a traffic
stop.359 The ruling was an inevitable consequence of the current law of qualified immunity.
Before so holding, however, Reeves took the time, “[i]n accordance with Supreme Court
precedent, . . . [to] look at the ‘origins’ of the relevant law.”360 In a section of his opinion
titled “Historical Context,” Reeves devoted twenty-seven pages of a seventy-two-page
opinion to a discussion of the origins and evolution of both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
doctrine of qualified immunity.361 What’s more, Reeves declined to exercise his discretion
under Pearson v. Callahan362 to grant qualified immunity without reaching the merits of
the underlying constitutional violation and, instead, took the time to determine whether
Jamison’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.363 Both of these jurisprudential
steps speak precisely to the kind of transparency for which this Note advocates. In
particular, Reeves’s devotion to acknowledging and discussing the historical origins of the
“relevant law” should be taken as the best form of judicial activism—where jurists do not
shy away from rendering fully transparent judicial opinions. Certainly, every jurist need
not discuss the origins of every legal principle to such a fulsome degree as did Judge Reeves
in Jamison. But to present legal principles without any acknowledgment of their origins—
as Justice White so often did in Lyons and as so many jurists before him did throughout the
Lyons ancestry—is a jurisprudential choice fundamentally at odds with the value of
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transparency. With time, the cumulative effect of such obfuscating choices is to render ours
a government of words, and not of laws.
Of course, the choice to contextualize the origins of a legal principle generates further
normative choices. Judge Reeves’s decision to thoroughly contextualize the relevant law
is one choice, and his decision to highlight certain facets of the legal history is another
choice. But even where the present case does not lend itself to a full discourse on legal
origins, normative choices must be made, and these choices significantly impact the
relative transparency achieved.
Consider, for example, the choices made in writing a simple parenthetical citation to
Lyons itself. One recent Lyons parenthetical reads, “holding that appellant’s claim for
injunctive relief is moot because ‘there was no finding that [he] faced a real and immediate
threat of [repeated illegal conduct].’”364 Setting aside what should be an obvious error
(Lyons actually held that the claim was not moot), notice the bracketed “repeated illegal
conduct” in place of Lyons’s “again being illegally choked.”365 The choice to generalize
from the specific may be natural to the legal profession and may have practical value, but
that choice nevertheless carries normative implications because it launders the law when it
articulates the principle. But both the specific and the general can co-exist without
sacrificing legal clarity. Indeed, as this Note has argued, such generalization can obfuscate
the factual truth that inheres to the legal principle. Likewise, notice that the parenthetical
strips Lyons of his identity; he is “appellant” now. While generalizing may be adequate,
generalizing does not promote transparency, nor does it center the human beings impacted
by the decision. This illustrative parenthetical could convey the same legal principle
without obscuring the important factual context through which that principle was forged.
Consider, as but one variation, this parenthetical instead: “holding that Lyons, a
Black man, lacked standing for injunctive relief because ‘there was no finding that [he]
faced a real and immediate threat of again being illegally choked.” These are not “major”
changes, but they enhance transparency without diminishing legal clarity. While
“appellant” adds nothing to one’s understanding of the holding, “Lyons, a Black man”
reminds us of the litigant’s name, race, gender, and humanity. A human named Adolph
Lyons was denied relief. He was a man. And he was Black. These facts are far from
irrelevant, and including them adds only a few words and takes nothing from the expression
of the principle. Even “Black appellant” would be preferable when we consider the
judiciary’s proclivity for willful colorblindness.366 Likewise, “again being illegally
choked”—the language from Lyons itself—preserves some of Lyons’s factual context
without sacrificing clarity. Here, the court replaced “again” with “repeated,” changed
“illegally” to “illegal,” and generalized “choked” into “conduct.” These choices do not
enhance the clarity of the legal principle, but they do play a role in subverting transparency.
Again, this is just an example, and affording thorough consideration to such normative
choices is beyond the scope of this Note. These illustrative revisions serve simply to
highlight this truth: when discussing legal principles or citing caselaw, jurists make
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choices, and these must be active, conscious, and conscientious choices if we are to
advance the cause of transparency in the judiciary.
Such a focus on contextualization could also have applications in the Court’s stare
decisis analysis, which currently does not interrogate the factual contexts in which
decisions were rendered other than to ask if the facts have changed.367 And while the Court
does consider a decision’s relative age, it gives greater weight to older decisions in part
because of reliance interests.368 But what the Lyons lineage should reveal is that our distrust
of decisions might increase, not decrease, with age. Indeed, there may be certain temporal
lines of demarcation that can help determine the degree of skepticism with which longestablished principles should be reviewed. For example, principles that originated prior to
the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments, or the Nineteenth Amendment, or
perhaps the Voting Rights Act, might be accorded less weight than those fashioned later
because the Justices who shaped them were appointed and confirmed by politicians who
were elected by only a fraction of the people. To weigh such principles equally with those
principles more recently developed is to allow Justices long passed to continue to sit in
judgment over the likes of Adolph Lyons—Justices like John Marshall who, though
possessed of powerful legal minds, also enslaved human beings.
To make such a searching inquiry into jurisprudential principles may seem a daunting
and unmanageable task, but the work is no less essential just because it is difficult. And the
work snowballs, getting easier as more jurists embrace contextualizing the origins of
relevant law. As a case in point, Judge Reeves’s discussion of the evolution of the
Reconstruction statutes and qualified immunity in Jamison need not be cabined to that case.
It is an easy thing for other jurists to quote—and even reframe, if they choose—that
discussion when rendering similar decisions. In short, transparency does not demand that
we continually reinvent the wheel; rather, transparency is a project in which jurists can
engage as necessity and practicality dictate.
Nor is such a project limited to jurists and their clerks. Legal practitioners can
participate in promoting transparency by making arguments regarding the contextual
origins of the legal principles at issue. Very likely such arguments will often be unavailing,
but that should not deter those committed to transparency from making the arguments and
thereby challenging the courts to respond to them. Just as Justice White’s rejection of
Adolph Lyons was the culmination of 150 years of evolving jurisprudence—just as it took
far more Justices than the nine sitting on the bench in 1983 to close the courthouse doors
on Lyons—so, too, a project to reform the judiciary, beginning with transparency, will take
the combined efforts of many jurists and attorneys, and it too will take time.
CONCLUSION
George Floyd was murdered, in part, because the Court—not the Burger Court, or
today’s Court, or the Court at the Founding, but the Court as the head of a branch of
government unbounded by time—suffers from its own, peculiar multi-generational biases,
a penchant for an obfuscatory species of judicial activism, and, most critically, a
jurisprudential process that slowly but surely affords such systemic biases time and space
to take root. In short, the federal judiciary suffers from systemic problems that judicial
367
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processes themselves reinforce. But this Note proposes that the cure does not require a
radical upheaval. Rather, valuable, apolitical reform is possible through modest
jurisprudential adjustments.
Chief Justice Marshall famously asserted that “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”369 At first blush, perhaps Marshall’s
language suggests that it is the judiciary’s jurisdictional duty to announce law, to
“discover” law, or to have the final word among the branches, but Marshall’s words can
also serve as an admonition and, even, an aspiration. That is, it is the duty of the third
branch to state the law, fully and thoroughly, without diminishing the factual and historical
contexts through which the law has been shaped. The Article III judiciary should be held
to the Chief Justice’s emphatic command. If factually barren generalizations that obscure—
intentionally or unintentionally—the contextual origins of legal principles sufficiently state
the law, then our judicial processes are healthy. But if “concrete adverseness” does indeed
“sharpen[] the presentation of issues necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional
questions,”370 then such concreteness inheres to the law. The law is not truly the law when
it is stripped of those facts which the Court itself considers essential to saying “what the
law is.” For, again, the law is not doctrine derived from cases and controversies; the law is
cases and controversies.
Nearly a year following George Floyd’s death, his brother, Philonise Floyd, said of
George, “I know that he’s with us, and he’s standing up . . . . America, we need to heal.
This nation needs healing. Our family needs healing.”371 Part of that healing must focus on
our judiciary. The Court is not, alone, responsible for George Floyd’s murder, but it played
a role—substantially the one in which Justice Thurgood Marshall cast the majority when
he wrote in dissent that:
The Court today holds that a federal court is without power to enjoin the
enforcement of the City’s policy, no matter how flagrantly unconstitutional
it may be. Since no one can show that he will be choked in the future, no
one—not even a person who, like Lyons, has almost been choked to death—
has standing to challenge the continuation of the policy. The City is free to
continue the policy indefinitely as long as it is willing to pay damages for
the injuries and deaths that result . . . . Under the view expressed by the
majority today, if the police adopt a policy of “shoot to kill,” or a policy of
shooting one out of ten suspects, the federal courts will be powerless to
enjoin its continuation. The federal judicial power is now limited to levying
a toll for such a systematic constitutional violation.372
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Just as Justices long passed joined the Burger Court in silencing Lyons, so too, today, the
Burger Court continues its effort to keep the courthouse doors closed. The suit filed by
Floyd’s family against the City of Minneapolis proves that Justice Marshall was right. The
Floyd family alleged a pervasive, city-sanctioned practice of allowing unconstitutional
police violence.373 And while not adopting a policy of “shoot to kill,” the Minneapolis
Police Department allowed, among other things, “Killology” training, where police
officers are taught “to consider every person and every situation as a potential deadly threat
and to kill ‘less hesitantly.’”374 Yet, despite this policy, the Floyd family could only seek
monetary damages; they did not even ask for an injunction.375 How could they? Lyons is
insurmountable. The federal district court was, indeed, “limited to levying a toll” for a
systemic constitutional violation, so the City settled for $27 million.376 As the City
announced the settlement, the City Council President acknowledged that ‘“no amount of
money’ could bring Floyd back.”377 Truly, with at least $3 billion paid out in police
misconduct settlements between 2011 and 2021 alone,378 it is clear that no amount of
money can remedy problems that the Constitution is structured to solve or cure violations
the Constitution explicitly prohibits. Police violence goes on undeterred. And, regardless,
no amount of money can change the fact that George Floyd—and uncounted others—are
gone.
We cannot fix these problems with existing methodologies. If we are to reform, if
we are to heal, the Court as an institution, we must recognize that “[t]he dogmas of the
quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty,
and we must rise—with the occasion . . . we must think anew, and act anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”379 What was true for President
Abraham Lincoln in 1862 is true for us in 2021. But today, disenthralling ourselves begins
with transparency. Only by embracing that principle in jurisprudence can we rise to the
occasion of contemporary problems like unchecked, unconstitutional, and racist police
violence and actively choose from among those “dogmas of the quiet past” which we will
reaffirm and which we will abandon. Only through a reimagined commitment to
transparency can we begin the (impossible) process of finding justice for George Floyd.
Only through transparency can we begin to make his family, our people, and our
Constitution whole.
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